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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on modern economic growth and struc-
tural transformation, in particular touching on the reallocation of labor across indus-
tries, occupations, and employment statuses.
The first chapter investigates the quantitative importance of non-employment in
the labor market outcomes for the United States. During the last 50 years, pro-
duction has shifted from goods to services. In terms of occupations, the routine
employment share decreased, giving way to increases in manual and abstract ones.
These two patterns are related, and lower non-employment had an important role. A
labor allocation model where goods, market services, and home services use different
tasks as inputs is used for quantitative exercises. These show that non-employment
could significantly slow down polarization and structural transformation, and induce
significant displacement within the labor force.
The second chapter, coauthored with Bart Hobijn and Todd Schoellman, looks at
the demographic structure of structural transformation. More than half of labor re-
allocation during structural transformation is due to new cohorts disproportionately
entering growing industries. This suggests substantial costs to labor reallocation. A
model of overlapping generations with life-cycle career choice under switching costs
and structural transformation is studied. Switching costs accelerate structural trans-
formation, since forward-looking workers enter growing industries in anticipation of
future wage growth. Most of the impact of switching costs shows on relative wages.
The third chapter establishes that job polarization is a global phenomenon. The
analysis of polarization is extended from a group of developed countries to a sample
of 119 economies. At all levels of development, employment shares in routine occu-
pations have decreased since the 1980s. This suggests that routine occupations are
becoming increasingly obsolete throughout the world, rather than being outsourced
i
to developing countries. A development accounting framework with technical change
at the task level is proposed. This allows to quantify and extrapolate task-specific
productivity levels. Recent technological change is biased against routine occupations
and in favor of manual occupations. This implies that in the following decades, world
polarization will continue: employment in routine occupations will decrease, and the
reallocation will happen mostly from routine to manual occupations, rather than to
abstract ones.
ii
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Chapter 1
JOB POLARIZATION, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, AND
NON-EMPLOYMENT
1.1 Introduction
The labor markets in the United States have changed significantly during the last
50 years. The share of routine occupations, heavy on procedural and repetitive tasks,
decreased by 28%. On the other hand, manual occupations (heavy on physical tasks
and in-person interactions), and abstract occupations (heavy on problem solving and
creative tasks) increased by 27 and 45%. In terms of industries, the share of goods
fell by 49%, giving way to an increase in services of 33%.1 The first pattern is related
to the job polarization process, the shrinking concentration of employment in routine
occupations. The second pattern is related to the structural transformation process,
the reallocation of economic activity across industries.
This transition has received considerable attention due to its implications on wage
inequality and mobility costs. Routine occupations tend to be in the middle of the
wage distribution, so job polarization pattern translates into higher wage differen-
tials.2 Human capital has been shown to have a heavy occupation-specific compo-
nent, so displacements within the labor force would end up in costly adjustments for
the workers.3
1These are percentages with respect to their initial labor shares, so these don’t add up to zero.
2Goos and Manning (2007) study this pattern in the United Kingdom, Autor and Dorn (2013)
focus on the United States, while Goos et al. (2014) expand the analysis for 16 Western European
countries.
3Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) document this in the United States using data from the Panel
1
This paper speaks to the latter point. Some of the job polarization analyses
frame this transition in terms of job losses and disappearing routine occupations,
which ensue large and costly reallocations.4 Using data from the Current Population
Survey, I argue that this is not the case: the adjustment is mostly through decreases in
non-employment. Between 1968 and 2018 non-employment decreased from 33 to 22%,
a drop of 34%. This translated to an increase in abstract and manual occupations,
which explains the decrease in routine’s employment share.
This paper also speaks to the occupation-industry mix in the labor force. In
quantitative terms, both the occupation mix within industries, and the industry mix
within the economy play an important role in explaining overall polarization. Occu-
pational changes within industries have a stronger effect on the increase in abstract
occupations, while the shift towards services explains most of the increase in manual
occupations.
In this article I ask about the quantitative importance of the decrease in non-
employment for the productive structure of the economy. To answer that, I propose
a labor allocation model explaining the occupational and industrial structure of the
economy. It incorporates the non-employment decision, it justifies Baumol’s cost
disease from an occupational point of view, and gives the polarization process a
treatment of the forces taking place between and within broad industries.
This model distinguishes between occupations in labor, and industries in con-
sumption. Its building blocks are motivated by four patterns in the data. First, job
polarization has played in a smooth, constant fashion during the last 50 years, so a
persistent force should be behind these changes. Second, the adjustment implied a
Study of Income Dynamics.
4Examples include Autor (2010), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Jaimovich and Siu (2012), and
Mandelman (2016).
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decrease in non-employment, which requires including this margin. Third, the oc-
cupational structure within goods and services differs substantially, so the industrial
reallocation channel is of quantitative importance. Fourth, both the goods and ser-
vices industries have polarized similarly, so the forces behind polarization should be
occupation, rather than industry-specific.
To study the quantitative implications of the model, I calibrate it to the United
States using data from 1968 to 2018. I find that productivity growth is the highest
in routine occupations, followed by manual, abstract, and home production. The
model is successful in reproducing the occupation dynamics within goods and market
services, and is able to generate the movement towards market services we see in the
data.
Finally, to assess the quantitative importance of lower non-employment, I perform
two counterfactual exercises. The first exercise, inspired by women’s insertion into the
labor force, freezes non-employment at its 1968 level. This decreases the production
of goods and market services by 2 and 18%, holds back structural transformation to
its 1999 level, and decreases polarization by an average of 2%. The second exercise,
inspired by the home productivity slowdown reported in Bridgman (2016), has home
productivity growing at the rate of market services. This increases the production
of goods by 17%, decreases the production of market services by 27%, holds back
structural transformation to its 1977 level, and decreases polarization by an average
of 7.5%.5 This illustrates not only the importance of this channel, but that its causes
also play a important role.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the stylized facts behind
job polarization. Section 1.3 presents the model I use. Section 1.4 deals with the
quantitative matters: first it explains the estimation procedure, and then it goes over
5The comparison points are the model’s predicted outcomes for 2018.
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the counterfactual exercises. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes.
1.2 Job Polarization and Non-employment Changes
Between 1968 and 2018, the share of manual occupations in total employment
increased by 27 percent, the share of routine occupations decreased by 28 percent,
and the share of abstract occupations increased by 45 percent. This is to say, the oc-
cupational structure in the United States polarized. These large swings are described
as worrisome due to possible displacements to lower paid occupations, as the share
of routine occupations decreases, and a higher fraction of the employed population
works in lower paying jobs (Jaimovich and Siu, 2012). Meanwhile, non-employment,
the fraction of the population that is either unemployed or out of the labor force,
decreased 34 percent. These are large changes, and this section documents them with
more detail.
Accounting for non-employment’s decrease suggests that the net flow of people
from non-employment to employment account for polarization, not the flow of people
from routine occupations to non-employment. Over this period, the share of the pop-
ulation working in routine occupations remained flat during most of these years, while
the share in abstract and manual occupations increased. This is the novel, and main
contribution of the empirical analysis: that polarization happened through decreases
in non-employment. Few studies focus on this interaction. One notable exception
is Cerina et al. (2017), that analyzes how female working hours shaped polarization.
Even though the change in non-employment is one of the major adjustment margins,
its effect has gone mostly unnoticed in the polarization literature.
I document these changes using data from the Annual Social and Economic
(ASEC) supplement to the Current Population Survey. The focus is on the extensive
margin of labor: whether people work in one of the three groups of occupations, or
4
whether they are non-employed. I consider the population aged between 25 and 65
years, and use their labels to determine industry, occupation (for the employed), and
employment status. Lack of hourly data for all these years in CPS precludes studying
the hours worked, and therefore, leisure. Fortunately, changes in leisure hours do not
point at this being the leading force.6
In this paper I follow Corte´s et al. (2014) and construct the occupational cate-
gories, grouped by their task content. Abstract occupations are intense in tasks that
require problem solving, judgment, and creativity. Some examples are managers,
lawyers, and architects. Routine occupations are heavy on tasks that follow precise,
and well understood routinary procedures. Examples include cashiers, machinists and
travel agents. Finally, manual occupations rely more on tasks that require flexibility,
in-person interactions, and physical adaptability. These include janitors, bartenders,
and nursing aides. Appendix A.1 presents a more detailed discussion of this data
source and the classifications.
1.2.1 Hollowing Out the Employment Distribution
Job polarization has been described as a “hollowing out” of the occupational
distribution, since routine occupations are also in the middle of the wage distribution.
Indeed, the employment share of routine occupations decreased by 0.33 percentage
points per year, which has happened steadily and as early as 1968.
The employment share of routine occupations fell 16.4 percentage points during
the 1968-2018 period. Figure 1.1 shows this by plotting the employment shares for
6As Cerina et al. (2017) note, most of polarization can be attributed to women, but Aguiar and
Hurst (2007), document that leisure has increased almost identically by gender. These studies using
time-use surveys also note that total hours of work (including market and home work) are very
similar across genders. This suggests that the intensive margin, at the aggregate level, is not the
main force driving polarization, and as such is left out of this analysis.
5
Figure 1.1: Occupational Job Polarization
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Shaded areas indicate years of major changes in occupational codes. These percentages
refer to each occupation’s share in employment.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
these three occupations. The hollowing out is fairly evident: while manual occupa-
tions gained 3 percentage points, abstract occupations gained 13.4. By 2018, the
employment shares of abstract and routine occupations were the same.
In addition, these changes have been smooth, and fairly constant over time. A
regression analysis summarizes these points more clearly. Table 1.1 presents the
results of regressing the employment shares against a constant term and a trend. All
trends are statistically significant, show a good fit to the data with low dispersion
around the regression lines. The constant trends mean that job polarization has been
happening during the entire period.7 Several of the studies concerning polarization
focus on more recent decades, and posit that it began in the 1980s. Since the CPS data
7The regression results for the first-differenced series throw very similar magnitudes, although
the coefficient in manual occupations stops being statistically significant.
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Table 1.1: Employment Share Regression Results
Constant Trend R2
Std. Error of
Estimate
Manual 10.48 0.08 0.74 0.66
Routine 60.51 -0.33 0.96 1.05
Abstract 29.01 0.25 0.96 0.78
These are the results of regressing the occupation’s employ-
ment share with a constant and a yearly trend term. All coef-
ficients are statistically significant at 1%. The standard error
of estimate is the standard deviation of the differences between
the observed and predicted shares.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
start in 1968, we can go further back in time and state that is has also been happening
in earlier years. This is in line with the findings of Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018), who use
Census data to document the same pattern for an even longer period.
1.2.2 Within Industry Job Polarization
Structural transformation, the reallocation of employment across industries, can
explain why polarization has been taking place. As industries that are more or less
intensive in routine occupations grow, they can drive the occupational employment
shares along with them. From an empirical point of view, can trends in this realloca-
tion between industries explain most of polarization? In this section, I argue that the
answer is no, that changes within these industries account for 66% of polarization.
This means that most of polarization happens because each industry is demanding
less routine workers, and more abstract workers. However, the changes between in-
dustries are also quantitatively important, in particular for manual occupations.
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The focus of this section are occupational employment shares, but conditional on
their industry: the goal is to establish the quantitative importance of the changes
within each industry. I organize the productive structure into two industries: goods
and services. Following the standard approach, the goods industry consists of agri-
culture and manufacturing, which include, among other categories, forestry and con-
struction. The services industry includes categories such as retail, and professional
and entertainment services.
Graphical examination of within industry occupational changes shows that these
are very similar over time. Figure 1.2 plots the employment shares of each occupation
within total employment in each industry. The first panel shows the shares of abstract
occupations, which increase over time for both industries. The second shows the
opposite effect for routine occupations, and the third shows that manual occupations
remain relatively flat, especially in the goods industry. Although the changes were
similar across industries, the magnitudes are larger for services: for the production
of goods, the drop in routine occupations was 8.2 percentage points, while it was
11.2 in services. In abstract occupations, the production of goods increased by 8.1
percentage points, and 11.7 in services.
The changes within industries are in line with aggregate changes for routine and
abstract occupations. For manual occupations, that is not the case: in the production
of goods, its share increased 0.1 percentage points, and decreased 0.5 in the production
of services, while overall, its employment share increased by 3. Within industry
changes, then, cannot explain the increase in the overall employment share in manual
occupations. To account for this, we need to turn to the changes in employment
between industries.
Changes between industries can be quantitatively important if the employment
shares within each industry are sufficiently different, and if we observe enough reallo-
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Figure 1.2: Occupation Shares Within Industries
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Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
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Figure 1.3: Industry Shares
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Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
cation across industries. For manual occupations, both conditions are satisfied. The
share of manual occupations in the production of services is 14 times as high as in
goods, and the process of structural transformation increased the employment share
in services by 19.7 percentage points. This last point is shown in Figure 1.3, that
plots the industry employment shares over time.
To measure the relative importance of these movements, I perform a shift-share
decomposition. Overall, changes within industries account for 66% of the occupational
shifts, while between industry changes account for the remaining 34%.8 The changes
within industries are most important in increasing abstract and routine occupations’
employment shares, while changes between industries matter the most for manual
occupations.
8These percentages correspond to the relative contributions of Table 1.2 weighted by their em-
ployment changes.
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The following paragraphs describe this shift-share decomposition. The basic idea
comes from expressing the aggregate share of each occupation as a weighted average.
For period t:
pt(j) =
∑
I
st(I)pt(j|I) (1.1)
where pt(j) is the economy-wide employment share of occupation j, st(I) is the
economy-wide employment share of industry I, and pt(j|I) is the share of occupation
j in industry I.
The change between period 0 and t can be decomposed into a between industry
effect, and a within industry effect. The between industry effect refers to structural
transformation. Services is more intensive in abstract and manual occupations than
goods, so higher employment shares in services imply higher abstract and manual
occupational shares in the economy. The within effect refers to the occupational mix
inside each industry. Over time, both the production of goods and services demand
more abstract occupations, and less routine ones. In particular:
∆pt(j) =
∑
I
∆st(I)p¯(j|I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between industries
effect
+
∑
I
∆pt(j|I)s¯(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within industries
effect
(1.2)
p¯(j|I) is the average between time 0 and t of the conditional occupation share, and
s¯(I) that of the industry share. Notice that this decomposition does not have any
residual term, since the employment changes are evaluated at their average over the
period.
Between-industry changes are the most important component for manual occu-
pations, while within-industry changes are the stronger one for routine and abstract
occupations. Table 1.2 shows this. About 90 percent of all of the increase in manual
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Table 1.2: Shift-Share Decomposition of Changes in Occupational Shares
Occupation
Absolute Change (p.p.) Relative Contribution (%)
Total Between Within Between Within
Change Industries Industries Industries Industries
Manual 3.8 3.4 0.4 89.5 10.5
Routine -16.9 -5.7 -11.1 33.7 66.3
Abstract 13.1 2.3 10.8 17.6 82.4
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
occupations is due to changes between industries, and over 80 percent of the increase
in abstract occupations is due to changes within industries. Finally, changes within
industries are the stronger component in the decrease of routine occupations. Over-
all, weighting these relative contributions by the magnitude of the employment share
change reveals that 66% of polarization is due to changes within industries, and 34%
due to changes between occupations.
In conclusion, the within-industry composition of the economy is the main driver of
polarization. It is important to include the industrial composition, however, especially
to account for the rise in manual occupations’ employment share. This goes in line
with previous findings: Autor and Dorn (2013) argue that the expansion of personal
services lies behind the increase in low-skill, manual occupations, while Tu¨zemen and
Willis (2013) and Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018) also show that within-industry changes
are more important for routine and abstract occupations. These also show similar
results when using finer classifications in industries and occupations.
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1.2.3 Lower Non-employment Filled the Edges
The “hollowing out” of the employment distribution can be easily associated to
decreases in routine employment, pushing workers into lower paying jobs, and non-
employment. In this section, I show that the data is at odds with that interpretation:
if we include non-employment as an additional category, routine occupations remain
fairly stable as a share of total population, as opposed to its decreasing employment
share. In addition, the decrease in non-employment allowed for increases in manual
and abstract occupations. This means that lower non-employment accounts for job
polarization, not decreases in routine employment.
Notice that including non-employed as an additional category changes the refer-
ence point: now we study total population aged between 25 and 65 years, rather than
employed workers. This allows to study the net flows among these categories, and to
better understand the changes leading to polarization.
Figure 1.4 plots non-employment, and workers in manual, routine, and abstract
occupations as shares of total population. There are three main takeaways from this
figure: manual and abstract occupations increased their share over time, routine’s
share remained fairly constant over time, and non-employment decreased for most of
this period.
The share of manual and abstract occupations in total population increased dur-
ing this period, the same way these increased their shares in employment. This means
that the increase in the employment shares of manual and abstract occupations re-
sponds to a net inflow of workers into these occupations. During these years, the
share of these occupations in total population grew by a factor of 1.46 and 1.69,
respectively.
The share of routine occupations in employment mostly fell because of lower non-
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employment: only 26% can be attributed to lower routine employment, and the
remaining 74 is due to higher employment in manual and abstract occupations. For
this, I use a Taylor approximation of the share in employment of routine occupations
pt(r):
pt(r) =
Rt
Rt +NRt
(1.3)
where Rt represents the share in total population of routine occupations, and NRt
represents the share in total population of non-routine occupations. Until 2007, only
9.7% of the decrease in routine occupation’s employment share was due to a lower
share of routine occupations in total population, and increased to 26% after the great
recession of 2008.
Finally, these changes were possible because of the reduction in non-employment.
Most of the decreases happened until 2000, and had an increase after the great reces-
sion that. However, the increases in employment in manual and abstract occupations,
that are mostly behind polarization, are the main forces explaining job polarization.
To sum up, in this section I argue that lower non-employment accounts for job
polarization, not decreases in routine employment. Net flows out of non-employment,
therefore, are key to explain overall polarization. If job displacements were the main
cause for the lower employment share in routine occupations, their share in total
population would have decreased significantly over time. This is not the case, so
we can discard displacements (or increases of it) as the main force behind the fall
of routine occupations. This is consistent with the findings in Corte´s (2016), where
panel data show scant evidence of displacement.
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Figure 1.4: Occupational Job Polarization & Labor Non-Participation
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Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
1.3 A Labor Allocation Model
Section 1.2 presented a new stylized fact about job polarization: that most of it
happened through decreases in non-employment. In this section, I use a model of
labor allocation to study quantitatively how changes in non-employment affected it.
Its contribution is to provide a general equilibrium framework to analyze the link
between non-employment, structural transformation, and job polarization.
Broadly speaking, this is a model of structural transformation where consumers
choose between goods and services; goods are produced in the market, and services
can be either produced in the market, or at home. In addition, market production
demands workers to perform different tasks, which translate into the three occupations
studied in the last section. These margins are needed to account for the employment
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shifts presented in the last section. The driving force is task specific technical progress,
so the difference in their growth rates induces the three main results: polarization,
structural transformation, and changes in non-employment.
The goal of this model is to assess the importance of changes in non-employment
for job polarization. The link between these two comes from the consumption of ser-
vices. Activities that were typically prepared within the household, which correspond
to home services in the model, are going through a process of “marketization.” This
means that they are now being traded in the marketplace, and some of the activities
performed as home production are substituted for services produced in the market.9
This marketization impacts the demand of occupations: higher demand for market
services boosts the demand for manual and abstract occupations, while higher de-
mand for home services increases non-employment. This trade-off between market
and non-market activities has not gone unnoticed in the literature, but few have fo-
cused it towards occupations. The following discussion presents only the relevant
aspects of the model; the complete presentation is left to Appendix A.3.
1.3.1 Preferences & Technology
This is a discrete-time model where time runs forever. On the consumption side,
there are identical households of measure one. These households value three types of
consumption: goods that can only be bought in the market, services bought in the
market, and services produced at home, as in Ngai and Petrongolo (2014). Differ-
ently from them, households only value consumption. The utility level in period t is
9An early recognition of the importance of home production, and the tendency towards marke-
tization is present in Kuznets (1941).
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aggregated according to a nested CES specification:
Ut(CGt, CSt) =
[
ω
1
ε
G(CGt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
S (CSt)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
(1.4)
where CGt and CSt denote the consumption of goods, and a basket of services. Their
relative preference weights are ωG and ωS, which add up to one, and individually
are between zero and one. These two consumption categories consist of broad, and
disparate types of consumption, which have an elasticity of substitution of ε > 0.
The basket of services is also represented through a CES aggregator:
CSt =
[
ϕ
1
η
M(CMSt)
η−1
η + ϕ
1
η
H(CHSt)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(1.5)
where CMSt and CHSt denote market and home services. Their relative weights are
ϕM and ϕH , which also add up to one, and individually are between zero and one.
The types of services provided by these two are much more similar, and their elasticity
of substitution is η > 0.
The production side of this economy has three types of output: goods, market
services, and home services. Firms producing goods and market services combine
manual, routine, and abstract tasks, while households producing their own services
require home workers. Notationally, I denote the sector of production by uppercase
letters, so I ∈ {G,MS,HS}. Occupations and tasks are denoted by lowercase letters,
so j ∈ {m, r, a, h} stand for manual, routine, abstract, and home.
Firms producing goods and market services follow the task approach to produc-
tion, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Firms, then, combine tasks to obtain output,
and hire workers to produce those tasks. Ultimately, these are combined through a
CES production function:
YIt =
 ∑
j∈{m,r,a}
α
1
σ
Ij(AjtNIjt)
σ−1
σ
 σσ−1 (1.6)
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where NIjt denotes the labor input that industry I uses to produce task j, and Ajt is
the labor productivity in task j. AjtNIjt then denotes the task input of j in industry
I. This task approach follows the same grouping principle for the occupations in the
empirical section, therefore workers hired to perform task j are working in occupation
j. The elasticity of substitution between the task inputs is σ > 0, and αIj ∈ (0, 1) is
the intensity of task j in industry I. Notice that productivity is task-specific, and is
the same across industries, as in Duernecker and Herrendorf (2016). Differently to
them, this technology is defined over three tasks.
Home services only require home workers to produce, so its technology is repre-
sented by a linear function:
YHSt = AhtNHSht (1.7)
where Aht denotes the productivity of home workers, and NHSht denotes the labor
input used in home services. These home workers provide the model’s counterpart to
non-employment.
Labor is homogeneous and perfectly mobile. This means that any two workers
can switch between occupations costlessly, and be equally productive if working on
the same task. In addition, I normalize the mass of workers to 1, so that all labor
inputs in the model match their empirical counterparts as shares in total population.
1.3.2 Competitive Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section, I analyze the labor reallocation patterns through the lens of the
model, assuming perfect competition. Over time, these will only change due to the
task-specific productivities. Therefore, I will analyze the productivity changes that
must take place to reproduce the employment patterns in Section 1.2. The model
structure requires productivity growth to be the highest in routine tasks, followed by
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manual, abstract and home production.
This result hinges on three key assumptions related to preferences and technology.
In particular, I assume:
1. Tasks to be complements in production.
2. Home and market services to be substitutes in consumption.
3. Goods and services to be complements in consumption.
These are all standard assumptions in the literature, and I will discus these choices
in the following subsections. Intuitively, complementarity means that the tasks and
categories are very different, and are hard to substitute from one another. The op-
posite is the case for substitutes: similar categories that are easier to exchange from
one another.
Under competitive markets, firms will maximize their profits, and households their
utility functions as price takers, as usual. I will analyze the result of these trade-
offs around four components: job polarization, industrial productivity, structural
transformation, and changes in non-employment.
Explaining Job Polarization
Job polarization within industries results from firms’ optimal combination of inputs.
Under perfect labor mobility, wages equalize across occupations. Therefore, the de-
mand for workers depends on the productivities of each of the tasks, and their elas-
ticity of substitution.
This is expressed more clearly using firms’ first order conditions. In industry I,
equalizing the marginal revenue from workers in tasks j and k yields the relative
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demand of occupations:
NIjt
NIkt
=
αIj
αIk
(
Akt
Ajt
)1−σ
(1.8)
This relative occupational demand depends on the relative intensities in that partic-
ular industry, and the relative task productivities. The elasticity of substitution, σ,
dictates how strongly industries react to changes in productivities.
When occupations are complements, rather than substitutes,10 firms react to pro-
ductivity increases by demanding more of the other occupations. Equation (1.8)
shows this more clearly: complementarity implies σ < 1, and increases in the produc-
tivity of task j will boost the relative demand of occupation k. This is due to the
cross-productivity effects. If task j increases its productivity, the marginal produc-
tivity of the workers in other occupations increases by more, and creates an “excess
supply” in occupation j. To benefit the most from this productivity boost, firms
demand more of the other occupations.
Recall from Figure 1.2 that polarization took place within industries. To reproduce
that pattern, the growth rate in the productivity of routine tasks has to be the highest
one, followed by manual, and finally abstract. This is due to the complementarity
assumption; it would be reverted if occupations were substitutes.
The productivity terms are modeled in reduced-form way, so these encompass
many forces pushing down the demand of routine occupations. Factors affecting
these productivities include plain capital accumulation, capital deepening as in Ace-
moglu and Guerrieri (2008), and increased substitutability with routine workers. The
10Recall that in this CES formulation, a unitary elasticity of substitution (σ = 1) implies a Cobb-
Douglas production function. As their substitutability decreases, and σ < 1, inputs are called gross
complements. In the limit case, when σ → 0, the function converges to a Leontief technology. When
σ > 1, inputs are gross substitutes, given their higher degree of substitutability. When σ →∞,
substitutability is perfect and the production function converges to a linear technology.
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common denominator in these changes is diminishing the cost of performing routine
tasks over time. Goos et al. (2014) use a similar approach, but focusing on the occu-
pational cost functions. Their approach on input prices is observationally equivalent
to one where the production function is modeled explicitly, as I do in this model.
Treating tasks as complements amounts to assuming that their elasticity of sub-
stitution, σ, is less than one. Most of the studies using different labor inputs treat
these as substitutes, rather than complements.11 The task approach to occupations
calls for a different interpretation. Since these tasks are very different, it is difficult
to substitute for one another. One could think of a production process that combines
manual, routine, and abstract tasks, and does so in relatively fixed proportions. This
technology is closer to a Leontief specification, which can be represented by a CES
production function with a low elasticity of substitution. The effect of increases in
productivities, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), is to create an “excess supply” of
that task, holding the labor composition constant.
Lastly, since productivity changes happen at the task level, it affects all industries
equally. This is also observed in the data. In the model, when the elasticity of
substitution is equal over industries, the changes in occupational demands should be
the same. In the data, comparing the changes in relative occupational shares reveals
a similar relationship.12
11Examples of this are Katz and Murphy (1992), that distinguish between educated and non-
educated workers, and Caselli (2015), that distinguishes between experienced and inexperienced
workers.
12One way to test this relationship is to take the ratio of (1.8) for a given occupation pair over
industries. This shows little variance over time: the coefficients of variation are 0.21 and 0.11, which
indicate relative stability.
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Explaining Industrial Productivity
The second pattern to focus on is the evolution of labor productivity at the indus-
try level. For the production of goods and market services, occupational demands
can be aggregated to a linear technology in total industry demand. At the optimal
occupational demands, the production function (A.2) can be rewritten as:
YIt = A˜ItNIt (1.9)
where
A˜It =
[
αIm
(
1
Amt
)1−σ
+ αIr
(
1
Art
)1−σ
+ αIa
(
1
Aat
)1−σ] −11−σ
(1.10)
is the average labor productivity in industry I ∈ {G,M}, and NIt is its associated
labor demand.
This productivity is a weighted average of each task’s productivity, when labor
inputs are combined optimally. With different productivity growth rates in tasks,
growth at the industry level will be non-linear, will vary over industries, and will
depend on each industry’s occupational intensity.
When tasks are complements, and with constant productivity growth, the indus-
try that uses more intensively the task with the highest (lowest) productivity growth
increases its overall productivity the most (least). Asymptotically, industry produc-
tivity growth rates will converge to the rate of the task with the lowest growth rate.
As the share of the occupation with the higher productivity growth decreases, so
does its contribution to the growth rate of that industry’s productivity. Polarization,
then, ends up dampening these productivity gains. At some point in the reallocation
process, the share of the occupation with the lowest productivity growth will be so
high that its effect on industry productivity will be the only discernible one.
Baumol’s cost disease lies at the heart of these dynamics. In their reappraisal of
the unbalanced growth model, Baumol et al. (1985) discuss that the progressivity or
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stagnancy of economic activities is caused by the technological advances behind their
inputs, which correspond to occupations in this setting. The literature in structural
transformation has established, by several measures, that goods-producing industries
have had higher productivity growth, compared to services-producing industries.13
This would require goods to be more intensive in routine tasks, and market services
to be more intensive in abstract tasks. The data show that this is clearly the case:
on average, goods use 63% more routine workers than services, and services use 50%
more abstract.
For notational completeness, define the industry equivalent of (1.10) for home
services production:
YHt = A˜HtNHt where A˜Ht = Aht (1.11)
Marketization
The third pattern to focus on is the marketization of home production, which relates
to the reallocation of productive resources from the home sector to the market.
The decision to consume home services is slightly different than that of goods
and market services. To consume home services, households must produce them
themselves and give up the market income that they would otherwise earn. The
opportunity cost of home production is pHt = wt/A˜Ht. In equilibrium, the relative
price of home to market services will be inversely related to the sectoral productivities:
pHt
pMt
=
A˜Mt
A˜Ht
(1.12)
Households decide their consumption patterns in services taking into account these
13A review of this literature, and evidence for several countries is presented in Herrendorf et al.
(2014a).
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relative prices. This translates into the following labor allocations:
NHt
NMt
=
ϕH
ϕM
(
A˜Mt
A˜Ht
)1−η
(1.13)
Then, again, the evolution over time of this labor allocation will depend on the
degree of complementarity and the relative productivity growth. If home and market
services are good substitutes, increases in the relative price of home production lead
households to substitute its consumption with market services. To do this, they
decrease the relative amount of labor dedicated to home production.
This is the marketization result discussed in Freeman and Schettkat (2005): the
United States has seen a shift of traditional household production to the market.
In the model this would reflect a decrease in the relative labor allocated to home
production. This, again, calls upon questioning how reasonable the assumptions
behind this result are.
Firstly, we should analyze the existence of the home sector itself. Kuznets (1941)
was well aware of this fact, and pointed out that incomes within the family economy
were a prominent missing item in his estimates of national income. His approxima-
tions amounted to more than a quarter of national income in 1929. Hill (1985) uses
time-use surveys to establish that for married couples in the mid-1970s, time spent
on home work was only slightly behind market work. More recently, Aguiar and
Hurst (2007) also find that the amount of hours in home production are substantial,
compared to market hours, albeit decreasing over time. These observations should
be enough to agree with Benhabib et al. (1991, p. 1185): “models without home
production implicitly make the assumption that the willingness or the incentive of
individuals to substitute between market and nonmarket activity is small, but this
does not seem to be the conclusion one would want to draw from the evidence.”
Secondly, in this model, the time that is not spent in market work is dedicated
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exclusively to home production. Ngai and Pissarides (2008b) posit that in terms of
the production carried out in the household, only home services remain. They analyze
a much longer time period, and use a structure where home work could be devoted
to the three sectors in their study: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. By the
late 1920s, they conclude that home production in agriculture and manufacturing was
practically gone. Thus, I align with their observations, and assume these productions
away.
In this model, the people that are not working in the market are engaging in home
production. Time use surveys show that non-employed people engage mostly in home
production, performing activities like housework, cooking, and child care (Ngai and
Pissarides, 2008b). Many of these activities have close counterparts in the market,
particularly in the services sector. Other articles building on this idea are Buera and
Kaboski (2012) and Ngai and Petrongolo (2014), which I adopt as well.
Thirdly, assuming market and home services are good substitutes in consump-
tion (η > 1) should not come as a controversial issue. Housework, shopping, food
preparation, and caring for other people are among the activities that take most of
the time in home production, according to time use surveys. These are all activities
that can be easily purchased in the modern marketplace, thus their high degree of
substitutability.
Lastly, since market and home services are good substitutes, households will tilt
their consumption to the sector with lower price, which is the sector with the higher
productivity growth rate. The increase in market participation requires a considerable
difference between the growth of home and market productivities. Bridgman (2016)
presents evidence to suggest that, effectively, productivity growth in the market has
outpaced home productivity, in particular during this paper’s period of study.
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Structural Transformation
The fourth pattern focuses on the reallocation of consumption and productive re-
sources between market industries, in particular from goods to services. Their relative
prices are, again, inversely related to their sectoral productivities:
pGt
pMt
=
A˜Mt
A˜Gt
(1.14)
Preferences are homothetic, so there are no income effects. The expenditure ratio and
labor allocation between market goods and services consists of two parts: one that is
a price effect, and another one that is a marketization effect. These are represented
by:
pMtCMt
pGtCGt
=
NMt
NGt
=
ωS
ωG
(
A˜Gt
A˜Mt
)1−ε
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price effect
ϕ1−εM
1 + ϕH
ϕM
(
A˜Mt
A˜Ht
)1−ηη−ε
1
1−η
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marketization effect
(1.15)
The price effect responds to relative productivity between market industries, while
the marketization effect responds to relative productivity between service industries.
The price effect behaves similarly to the canonical structural transformation model
of Ngai and Pissarides (2007b). In this setting, however, task-specific productivity
growth is responsible for the growth at the industry level. Complementarity between
goods and services (which requires ε < 1) implies that increases in the relative price
of services result in increases in its expenditure share.
The marketization effect, on the other hand, is somewhat similar to an income ef-
fect. An income effect would induce different consumption patterns, holding constant
the productivities across occupations. Within the context of structural transforma-
tion, Kongsamut et al. (2001a) introduce income effects with Stone-Geary prefer-
ences, and interpret the non-homotheticity term as home production. In this model,
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as home services become comparatively more expensive, households make up for this
by switching out of home production, increasing market work and purchasing more
services in the market.
Non-employment
The last component to focus on is the net effect of these forces on non-employment.
Structural transformation, with its decrease in the relative price of goods, makes
households want to increase their consumption of services. Marketization, on the
other hand, makes home production relatively more expensive to market services.
Then, the non-employment decision involves a trade-off between home production
and market consumption. In equilibrium, the ratio of market employment to non-
participation is:
NGt +NMt
NHt
=
1 + ωG
ωS
(
A˜St
A˜Gt
)1−ε
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Structural transformation
1 + ϕM
ϕH
(
A˜Ht
A˜Mt
)1−η
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marketization
−1 (1.16)
This expression separates the forces of structural transformation and of marketization.
An increase in this ratio implies an increase in labor force participation.
Structural transformation frees up labor that can be used to produce services.
This, absent a strong reallocation of consumption within services, would imply higher
non-employment. Home production would end up filling part of this increased demand
for services. Marketization has the opposing effect, since it becomes relatively cheaper
to consume more services from the market.
In the data, there is a sizable decrease in non-employment, most of which is used
to fill the increased demand for abstract occupations. This means that the forces of
marketization are considerably stronger than those of structural transformation.
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Summary of the Model
A brief summary of this model starts with productivity growth rates at the task level,
since their differences are the source of the reallocation patterns. The growth rate is
higher in routine tasks, followed by manual, abstract, and finally home production.
The interaction between these productivities, technology, and preferences yields five
outcomes:
Polarization: firms demand more workers in the abstract and manual occupations,
relative to routine, because tasks are complements in production.
Industry Productivity Growth: productivity growth is higher in goods because
it is more intensive in routine tasks than market services.
Marketization: households work more in the market and substitute home with mar-
ket services because of increasing opportunity costs of home production.
Structural Transformation: households demand more services because the rela-
tive price of goods decreases.
Non-employment: non-employment decreases because the effect of marketization
dominates the effect of structural transformation on services.
1.4 Quantitative Results: How Non-employment Affects Polarization
This section explores the quantitative side of the model. First, I describe the
estimation procedure, and analyze its results. With the estimation in hand, I conduct
two counterfactual exercises to assess the importance of the increase in labor force
participation.
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1.4.1 Calibrating the Model
In this section, I explain briefly how to calibrate the model, and the moments
I use. To begin with, I choose the two elasticities in the utility function based on
previous studies. Based on Duernecker and Herrendorf (2016), I set ε = 0.05 (between
goods and compound services). Based on Rogerson (2009) and Ngai and Petrongolo
(2014), I set η = 2.3 (between market and home services).14
With these restrictions, there are eleven time-invariant parameters and four termi-
nal conditions to determine: six task intensities (three for each market industry), the
labor elasticity of substitution in market production, the four final task productivi-
ties, and the four preference weights in the consumption (for goods and services, and
for home and market services). Assuming constant growth rates, there is only need
to look at the initial and final years, which are denoted here by t = 0 and t = T .15 I
back out their estimates from US data following these steps:
1. Impose the normalization Am0 = Ar0 = Aa0 = Ah0 = 1.
2. Use the initial market occupation shares NIj0 to solve for αIj.
3. Use the initial home and market services shares NH0, NM0 to solve for ϕH and
ϕM .
4. Use the initial market goods and services shares NG0, NM0 to solve for ωG and
ωS.
14This elasticity is in the high end of the estimates available. It was purposely chosen as such,
because these come from studies looking at the substitution between home and total market goods.
This selection attempts to make up for goods being included.
15Notice this same procedure could be used to infer a more detailed productivity path on a yearly
basis, but the smooth labor share paths suggest this is a reasonable assumption.
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5. Use the final employment shares in the market services industry NMjT to solve
for final relative productivities (AaT/ArT )
1−σ and (AmT/ArT )1−σ.
6. Use the final relative employment share NMT/NST to solve for the labor elas-
ticity of substitution σ.
7. Use the growth factor of real per capita GDP to solve for ArT .
8. Use the final home and market services shares to solve for AhT
Further details of this procedure are discussed in Appendix A.4. Table 1.3 shows the
time-invariant parameters of the model, and Table 1.4 the occupation and industry
productivity estimates.
These results are in line with those explained in the discussion section, so the
qualitative predictions remain. Now we can comment on their quantitative side. As
expected, growth in all occupation-specific productivities is positive. Productivity
growth is such that by 2018, a worker in routine occupations is 35% more productive
than a worker in manual occupations, and almost twice as much than a worker in
abstract occupations. This goes in line with the routinization hypothesis, but estab-
lished as a force working since (at least) the beginning of the sample. The elasticity of
substitution between occupations is considerably lower than other estimates. Again,
this stems from considering occupations as different factors of production, which is
induced by the task-oriented grouping.
Table 1.5 shows the model’s predictions with the estimated parameters. By design,
it is able to match all of the labor shares in 1968, and the relative labor shares
within services (for the three occupations in market services, plus the ratio between
market and home services). The model is fairly successful at reproducing the relative
occupation shares in the goods industry, and a little less so in reproducing the decrease
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Table 1.3: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Source
ε: Elasticity of substitution in utility
b/w goods and combined services
0.05 Herrendorf et al. (2013)
η : Elasticity of substitution in utility
b/w home and market services
2.30
Ngai and Petrongolo
(2014)
ωG: Preference weight for goods in
utility
0.27
Initial goods and services
relative price
ωS: Preference weight for combined
services in utility
0.73
Initial goods and services
relative price
ϕH : Preference weight for home services
in utility
0.45
Initial home and market
services labor shares
ϕM : Preference weight for market
services in utility
0.55
Initial home and market
services labor shares
σ : Labor elasticity of substitution in
production b/w market occupations
0.22
Final employment shares
in market services
αGa: Intensity of abstract occupations in
market goods production
0.22
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
αGr: Intensity of routine occupations in
market goods production
0.77
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
αGm: Intensity of manual occupations in
market goods production
0.01
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
αMa: Intensity of abstract occupations in
market services production
0.35
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
αMr: Intensity of routine occupations in
market services production
0.47
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
αMm: Intensity of manual occupations in
market services production
0.18
Initial industry-specific
occupation shares
All parameters, except the first two elasticities, are estimated from CPS data. See Section 1.4.1
and Appendix A.4 for more details.
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Table 1.4: Productivity Estimates
Year Average
1968 2018 Growth Rate
Ah: Home production 1 1.01 0.03%
Aa: Abstract occupations 1 1.32 0.56%
Ar: Routine occupations 1 2.59 1.96%
Am: Manual occupations 1 1.93 1.35%
A˜G: Market goods industry 1 2.15 1.57%
A˜M : Market services industry 1 1.87 1.29%
in the goods share. The normalized root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) shows that for
a model with constant growth rates, it is still satisfactory in capturing the main forces
driving the changes in labor markets.
1.4.2 Assessing the Importance of Non-employment
One of the main goals of this paper is to assess the importance of lower non-
employment in the distribution of employment in the United States. The model at
hand allows us to do this, and study its effects on structural transformation, on overall
polarization, and on sectoral output. To do that, I study two experiments. In the
first one, I restrict the model so that non-employment stays at its 1968 level. In the
second one, I increase the productivity growth in home production to shut down the
marketization channel. The comparison point of these exercises are the output levels
and labor allocations of the baseline model in 2018. The first year of my sample
coincides with the years when labor force participation started to increase. Juhn
and Potter (2006) report that between 1948 and 1968 the participation rate remained
32
Table 1.5: Actual and Fitted Labor Shares
1968 2018 Normalized
Data Model Data Model RMSE
Share of total population in:
Goods production 27.3 27.3 16.3 20.9 15.0%
Market services production 40.1 40.1 60.7 58.7 7.5%
Home services production 32.6 32.6 23.0 20.4 8.7%
Share of goods labor demand in:
Manual occupations 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 18.9%
Routine occupations 76.7 76.7 70.5 65.6 1.9%
Abstract occupations 22.1 22.1 28.5 33.2 8.1%
Share of market services labor demand in:
Manual occupations 18.1 18.1 17.7 17.6 8.7%
Routine occupations 47.4 47.4 38.3 36.2 8.0%
Abstract occupations 34.5 34.5 43.9 46.2 5.3%
Normalized root-mean-squared-error is calculated using the average of the time series.
relatively stable, and after that it increased. This provides a convenient turning point
to perform counterfactual exercises.
Freezing Non-Employment
The expansion of the labor force, which has lowered non-employment, has drawn a
considerable amount of attention recently, and has been associated with the insertion
of women into the workplace. Several interpretations have been presented to explain
this. One of them focuses on the social attitudes towards women’s work: Ferna´ndez
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et al. (2004) discuss the gradual transformation of the family model (where working
mothers set an example for future generations), while Goldin (2006) discusses several
other social changes fueling the “quiet revolution” that made women think in terms
of lifelong careers. In the spirit of these articles, I freeze non-employment at its level
in 1968. One interpretation of this counterfactual would be to consider how different
the productive structure would have been, had societal attitudes towards women’s
work not changed as much. The results of this are in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Freezing Non-employment, Counterfactual Results
Baseline Counterfactual Change
model prediction (%)
Non-employment 0.20 0.33 59.4
Goods output 0.46 0.45 -1.8
Market services output 1.08 0.87 -19.2
Share in labor force of:
Goods industry 0.26 0.30 15.5
Services industry 0.74 0.70 -5.5
Share in total population of:
Manual occupations 0.13 0.13 -5.0
Routine occupations 0.44 0.45 2.7
Abstract occupations 0.43 0.42 -1.2
This are the model’s predictions for 2018. The counterfactual exercise freezes the
labor force participation rate at its 1968 level, without assuming different rates
of productivity growth. Percent changes are reported with respect to the baseline
model’s predictions.
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Holding non-employment fixed decreases output in both market sectors, dispro-
portionately so for market services. This is not surprising, since this experiment
deliberately holds down the inputs for market production, and restricts households to
consume more home services than they would otherwise want. Within the workforce,
this slows down structural transformation: the employment share of goods ends up
being 16% higher, despite market productivities remaining the same. This division
of labor between goods and services makes the productive structure look like the
model’s prediction for 1999. Focusing on job polarization, the forces acting within
both industries would still take place, so the labor force would polarize to a similar
degree. The main difference is that in this case, the entirety of the adjustment takes
place within the labor force, instead of through an expansion of it. Then, worker
displacement would be a significant source of adjustment.
Increasing Home Productivity
Another explanation for the change in non-employment focuses on the productivity
of the household sector. In this vein, the second experiment keeps non-employment
from decreasing, but because of very different reasons. Bridgman (2016) suggests that
productivity growth in the home sector had a considerable slowdown, coinciding with
the initial years of this CPS sample. He also reports that previous to these years,
home productivity had been growing at a similar pace to market activities. This is
consistent with non-employment being stable before 1968, and increasing after this
break. This begs the question: if the slowdown in home productivity was the sole
cause of marketization, what would have happened without it? That is, how different
would the productive structure look like if productivity in the home production sector
had grown at the same rate as market services? The outcome of this experiment is
in Table 1.7.
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Table 1.7: Increasing Home Productivity, Counterfactual Results
Baseline Counterfactual Change
model prediction (%)
Non-employment 0.20 0.34 65.3
Goods output 0.47 0.56 18.2
Market services output 1.14 0.81 -29.2
Share in labor force of:
Goods industry 0.26 0.37 42.0
Services industry 0.74 0.63 -14.9
Share in total population of:
Manual occupations 0.13 0.12 -13.5
Routine occupations 0.44 0.47 -7.4
Abstract occupations 0.43 0.41 -3.4
This are the model’s predictions for 2018. The counterfactual exercise shuts down
the marketization channel by increasing home production’s productivity at the
same pace as market services. Percent changes are reported with respect to the
baseline model’s predictions.
The results in terms of output are more dramatic in this case: production in
goods increases, while in market services it decreases even more. Households are
much more efficient in producing their own services, so they do not increase their
reliance on the market. This explains the greater hit that market services take.
Non-employment increases; since I am purposely shutting down the marketization
channel, only structural transformation has an effect on the consumption of total
services (equation (1.16) shows this). These effects add up to goods having an even
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higher share in market employment, which increases by almost 40%. The resulting
division of labor makes the productive structure look like the model’s prediction for
1977. In terms of polarization, the intra-industry reallocation would still take place.
In this case, however, lower growth in market services leads to less polarization than
in the first counterfactual. As in the first counterfactual, all the reallocation would
happen within the labor force.
These two exercises illustrate how important the decrease in non-employment is for
both structural transformation and job polarization. In the two cases, both structural
transformation and polarization are slowed down by the induced dynamics of home
production. This raises the question of, for instance, to what extent the differences
in the labor market structure of the United States and some European countries are
driven by the channels highlighted in this model. Prescott (2004) explores the issue
of differences in hours worked by looking at taxes. Home production could play a
significant role in this setting. If cultural preferences favor home production, despite
a lower productivity in it, it could look more like the first counterfactual exercise. If,
on the other hand, European households did not experience a significant decrease in
their home productivity growth, it could look more like the second counterfactual.
These two cases show very different implications for growth and the causes for the
differences in their productive structures. Polarization slows down, but the road it
takes is quite different. Unfortunately, this model is unable to speak of mobility costs
by design. Displacement costs would play an important role in terms of welfare, and
could possibly slow down the adjustment process. This interesting avenue of research
is left for other research projects.
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1.5 Conclusions
In this article I study three recent trends in the United States labor market: job
polarization, structural transformation, and decreases in non-employment. With the
goal of quantifying the importance of the non-participation margin, I propose a labor
allocation model to explain this occupational and industrial structure.
Quantitatively, the model implies higher growth in the occupation of routine oc-
cupations, followed by manual, abstract, and finally home production. It is able to
reproduce the occupational structure within industries, and the shift towards market
services.
Counterfactual exercises suggest that this expansion is very important. Holding
constant the attitudes that allowed lower non-employment decreases the production
of goods and market services by 2 and 19%, holds back structural transformation to
its 1999 level, and decreases polarization by an average of 3%. The second exercise,
inspired by the home productivity slowdown reported in Bridgman (2016), has home
productivity growing at the rate of market services. This increases the production
of goods by 18%, decreases the production of market services by 29%, holds back
structural transformation to its 1977 level, and decreases polarization by an average
of 8%.
Future work includes extensions to this model to incorporate the age structure of
the economy through an overlapping generations setting, considering the gender com-
ponent to explain the wide differences in their labor market outcomes, and inducing
labor heterogeneity to include an analysis of wage polarization.
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Chapter 2
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION BY COHORT
2.1 Introduction
One of the key stylized facts of economic growth is that it involves structural trans-
formation: the reallocation of economic activity in predictable ways among the broad
industries of an economy. Whereas poor countries typically produce and consume a
high share of agriculture, growth entails a shift towards first manufacturing and then
services.1 A recent literature has explored different forms of preferences and techno-
logical progress that can generate this predictable reallocation of economic activity
as a consequence of growth (Kongsamut et al., 2001b; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007a).
Although the existing literature has advanced our understanding of structural
transformation along many dimensions, it is largely silent about the interaction be-
tween structural transformation and labor markets, for two reasons. First, there are
few stylized facts about structural transformation and labor markets.2 Most papers
use aggregate data from national accounts, which does little to clarify which workers
are responsible for labor reallocation. Second, most papers focus on the special case
of frictionless labor markets, which often allows for elegant analytical solutions but
abstracts from the interactions we are interested in. Our goal is to make progress
1See for example Schultz (1953) and Echevarria (1997) for early references, or Herrendorf et al.
(2014b) for a recent overview. Herrendorf et al. (2014b) shows that structural transformation is a
predictable function of PPP GDP p.c.
2There is however a large and related literature on gross worker flows between industries. See
for example Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) for the U.S. and Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) for the
United Kingdom.
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on both fronts: we document new stylized facts of what sorts of workers reallocate
during structural transformation; we develop a model consistent with these findings
and use it to help understand the relationship between labor markets and structural
transformation.
The starting point for our empirical contribution is to document stylized facts
about which workers reallocate across sectors during structural transformation. To
do so we utilize nationally representative, repeated cross sections spanning a long time
series for the United States and shorter time series for 60 other countries. By using
repeated cross sections we can track reallocation based on observable characteristics
such as education. Figure 2.1 gives a visual representation of our approach for the
case of the United States, 1870–2010. The three panels plot the employment shares by
birth cohort for each decadal census in which these workers were between the ages of
20 and 70. Each line plots the time series for the workers in a particular birth cohort
with the dot at the beginning of the line showing their employment share when they
enter the workforce.
The overall pattern in the figure clearly shows the decline in the employment share
of agriculture, the rise and then fall of the manufacturing share, and the increasing
share of services over time. The second important point of this figure is that the lines
for the individual cohorts do not overlap. Within a given year, newer and older cohorts
have different employment patterns. In particular, the lines for each cohort appear to
be “flatter” than the pattern for the overall economy. This is a very informal way of
saying that within-cohort shifts in employment shares tend to be smaller than those
in the overall economy and that differences in employment shares between cohorts
are an important part of the sectoral reallocation of labor that has occurred in the
United States. We formalize this finding using an accounting decomposition, which
shows that 53 percent of reallocation happens between cohorts, both in the United
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Figure 2.1: Structural Transformation in the United States
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States and in our international sample.3 We also show that much of the within cohort
(life-cycle) reallocation happens at earlier ages.
These findings suggest that new cohorts play a central role in the process of struc-
tural transformation. They lead us to formulate a heterogeneous agent overlapping
3Earlier authors have documented similar patterns for specific cases: Kim and Topel (1995) in
Korea and Perez (2016) for Argentina. Porzio and Santangelo (2017) document similar facts for
a large set of countries similar to ours for reallocation out of agriculture. We adopt the format of
figure 2.1 from their work.
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generations model of life-cycle career choice under switching costs and integrate it
into a canonical model of structural transformation.4 The idea is that switching costs
prevent older workers from moving between industries and hence give a prominent
role to new cohorts for generating structural transformation. In doing so, we deviate
from the common assumption of a single frictionless labor market that is made in
many growth models, including those with structural transformation. In such a labor
market, wages are equated across sectors, which runs counter to empirical evidence
(Kim and Topel, 1995; Herrendorf and Schoellman, 2018).
An important contribution of our modeling strategy is to show how to formulate
this problem in a tractable way. This is challenging at three levels. First, we need a
tractable way to characterize the life-cycle career path of each individual agent as a
function of wages. Second, wages themselves depend on the labor supply of past and
future cohorts, which requires us to find a way to iterate on the entire path of labor
supply and wages. Finally, our labor markets are part of structural transformation,
which implies that the economy is experiencing unbalanced growth. We show how to
overcome these challenges in our quantitative implementation.
At the aggregate we formulate structural transformation as in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007a). Differential technology growth across sectors and a low elasticity of substi-
tution in the utility function generate trends in both relative prices of goods produced
in different sectors as well as the relative levels of labor demand across sectors. This
formulation of structural transformation is useful for our purposes because it relies
on homothetic preferences, which implies that we can solve for relative consumption
as a function of only relative prices and not the entire distribution of income.
4We use the life-cycle career choice to mean the sequence of industries of employment. Duer-
necker and Herrendorf (2017) document a close linkage between reallocation across industries and
reallocation across occupations during structural transformation.
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Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the life-cycle career choice of
workers. Workers decide on their labor supply taking into account their idiosyncratic
sector-specific skills, as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel
(2018), the current and future wages in each of the sectors, and the current and
expected future retraining costs, as in Caselli and Coleman (2001b), associated with
changing sectors of employment.5 We deviate from previous authors by formulating
the career choice problem as a dynamic discrete choice problem. Doing so allows us
to utilize known closed form solutions for life cycle sector choice and labor supply and
avoid numerical integration, which greatly reduces the scale of the problem. Finally,
we show how to adopt the extended path method of Fair and Taylor (1983) to this
environment with unbalanced growth and solve for the equilibrium path of our model.
Our model provides four important insights. The first is that retraining costs
for workers accelerate structural transformation. The reason for this counterintuitive
result is the following. Given an initial sectoral allocation of labor, retraining costs
slow sectoral reallocation down. However, forward-looking workers who face training
and retraining costs change their initial labor allocation and shift their labor supply
towards growing industries in anticipation of the future productivity and wage growth.
This shift in initial sectoral choice more than compensates for lower life cycle sectoral
reallocation.
The second result is that retraining costs need to increase with age to match
cohort career profiles. To understand this, note that the model embeds an option
value to working in a growing industry because of expected future relative wage
growth. However, this option value declines as workers get older and have a lower
5Cociuba and MacGee (2018) also consider sectoral adjustment costs of workers, but do so in
a stationary model with search frictions that is suitable at business cycle frequencies but does not
allow for the analysis of the long-run trends in structural transformation that we consider here.
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expected length of their future career. As a result workers with a high idiosyncratic
opportunity in a declining industry are more inclined to switch industries as they
grow older, contrary to the data. In order to prevent these switches, retraining costs
need to be increasing in age to offset the decline in the option value of being in a
growing industry.
The third insight is that most of the impact of retraining costs is the on the trends
in relative wages across sectors and not on the shares of workers employed. This is
due to the aggregate technology being parameterized as near-Leontief to be consistent
with historical trends in value added shares and relative prices in the U.S. (Ngai and
Pissarides, 2008a).
The final insight is that because more workers will line up in the service sector
when structural transformation accelerates unexpectedly, such an acceleration reduces
wages in the service sector in the decades directly after. This reduction disproportion-
ately affects the career earnings outlook of older workers in the service sector when
the shock hits. In the longer-run the shock reduces relative wages in agriculture and
manufacturing.
2.2 Cohort Effects and Structural Transformation
In this section we document stylized facts of worker reallocation across indus-
tries that motivate our model in Section 2.3. We focus our attention on a classic
three-industry view of the U.S. time series, with some additional results from a large
international sample presented for comparison. Details of the data construction and
results from alternative industry decompositions are reserved to the appendix.
Our baseline analysis uses the United States census microdata spanning 1870–
2010, taken from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010). We study the structural transfor-
mation of employment, which is constructed using the reported industry of employed
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workers with valid responses. IPUMS has devoted substantial effort to harmonizing
responses to these and other key variables over time and across countries. We ag-
gregate detailed industry classifications to the standard three broad industry groups:
agriculture, manufacturing, and services.6 We impose no other sample restrictions,
because we want the results derived from microdata to be consistent with aggregate
trends.
Our main empirical finding is that much of structural transformation can be ac-
counted for by new workers who enter growing sectors disproportionately. Figure 2.1
provides a visual representation of this finding for the United States. It plots sectoral
employment shares against time, with each individual line representing a distinct
decade-of-birth cohort followed over their working life. Ignoring for a moment the
distinct lines, the general employment patterns are clear: the decline of agriculture;
the inverse-U shape of manufacturing; and the rise of services. The individual lines
show that within a particular year younger cohorts had different employment patterns
than older ones. For example, in 1900 the younger cohorts had about 15 percent lower
employment shares in agriculture and correspondingly higher employment shares in
manufacturing and services. The between-cohort gaps within a year provide visual
evidence of the importance of cohort effects for structural transformation.
To document this pattern more carefully we utilize a within-between accounting
decomposition. Denote by et(i) sector i’s employment share at time t and by ∆et(i)
the change in sector i’s employment share between t − 1 and t. We decompose this
total change into two pieces: the portion accounted for by changes in the employment
share of the cohort who is age h at time t, nt(h); and the portion that is accounted
for by the changes in the employment patterns of each cohort, et(i;h). The usual
6Agriculture includes all of farming, forestry, and fishing. Manufacturing includes also mining
and construction. Services includes utilities.
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decomposition holds:
∆et(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total
=
∑
h
nt(h)∆et(i;h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-cohort
+
∑
h
∆nt(h)et(i;h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
between-cohort
, (2.1)
where ∆ denotes differences between t − 1 and t and bar denotes averages between
t− 1 and t.
We use variance-covariance accounting to perform the decomposition. The within
and between shares are simply the covariance of the within and between terms with
the total, relative to the variance of the total. This accounting procedure is identical
to classical ANOVA. It can also be implemented in a straightforward way by taking
the estimated coefficients from regressing the within and between components on the
total component without a constant.
Table 2.1: Between Cohort Share of Structural Transformation
Sample Total By Industry
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
United States 53% 71% 36% 41%
International 53% 66% 23% 48%
Table 2.1 shows the result of this decomposition. In the first row we show the
results for the United States, where we study reallocation between each consecutive
pair of censuses, usually taken a decade apart. In the first column we show the results
from pooling all three industries. In this case, the between cohort share of structural
transformation is just over half, meaning that a little more than half of structural
transformation is accounted for by the propensity of new cohorts of workers to work
in growing sectors. The remaining columns show the results separately for agricul-
ture, manufacturing, and services. The between share is highest for agriculture and
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somewhat lower for manufacturing and services. These findings are consistent with
the work of Kim and Topel (1995), who showed that between-cohort reallocation was
central to the decline of agriculture in South Korea, and support the focus of Porzio
and Santangelo (2017) on the role of cohorts for agriculture versus non-agriculture.
Although we focus on the United States, the underlying patterns are quite similar
for the international sample, which includes 201 nationally representative surveys
from 59 other countries, allowing us to decompose structural transformation across
142 consecutive survey pairs around the world. The results are shown in the second
row of Table 2.1. The overall share of 53 percent is almost identical to the share for
the United States. The shares by industry are also quite similar, with again a much
larger role of the between share in agriculture.
Just over half of structural transformation is driven by the replacement of old
cohorts by new ones. Further, much of the within-cohort reallocation happens early
in the life cycle. To document this point, we exploit the fact that our accounting
equation is additive in age. We then decompose the within share into the portion
that happens within a cohort for those aged 20–29 at time t − 1; those aged 30–39
at time t− 1; and so on. The results are shown as solid circles for the United States
and the international sample in Figure 2.2. A further 15–25 percent of all structural
transformation happens from the 20s, with the pace of reallocation slowing with age,
somewhat more rapidly for the international sample.
Examination of the within component in equation (2.1) shows that it can de-
cline for two reasons: because the employment share of a cohort falls with age
(falling nt(h)); or because cohorts are less likely to switch sectors as they age (falling
∆et(i;h)). It is useful for our purposes to distinguish between the effects of the em-
ployment share versus the unweighted reallocation. The diamonds in Figure 2.2 plot
the average employment share by age. The squares, plotted against the right axis,
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Figure 2.2: Within cohort effects by age
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show the unweighted reallocation, which is the result of doing the same variance-
covariance decomposition using only ∆et(i;h) as our measure of within. Although
this no longer decomposes total reallocation, it does isolate the pure behavioral re-
sponse. Indeed, we can see that both for the United States and the international
sample the declining within share is driven primarily by a falling employment share
by age. The unweighted reallocation effect is mixed: it falls in importance until age
40 or 50 before rebounding and becoming more important at older ages.
To summarize, the main contribution of our empirical work is to show that half
of structural transformation seems to be accounted for by the fact that new cohorts
disproportionately enter growing sectors. Much of the rest happens early in the life
cycle, although this is driven more by demographics than by the behavioral responses
of workers. These facts motivate us to write down a model of structural change where
demographics and the employment choices of new workers play the central role.
One possible concern with our approach is that our between-cohort effects may
proxy for other slow-moving trends that are the fundamental driving forces of struc-
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tural transformation. For example, recent work has stressed the role of education and
female labor force participation for structural transformation (Caselli and Coleman,
2001b; Rendall, 2017; Buera et al., ming; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017). We test the
importance of these factors by examining the share of structural transformation that
happens within and between gender × marital status × education groups. We use
binary gender and marital status categories and four education bins, which produce
a total of 16 possible cells. Table 2.2 shows the corresponding accounting results. 16
percent of structural transformation happens between demographic cells, which is a
much lower share than our cohort results above.7 This finding suggests to us that
cohort is not simply a proxy for trends in education, female labor force participation,
and so on. This suggests that new cohorts inherently account for much of structural
transformation. We turn now to a model that captures this idea.
Table 2.2: Between Demographic Group Share of Structural Transformation
Total By Industry
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
United States 16% 10% 19% 18%
2.3 Structural Transformation with Career Choices
Our empirical findings suggest that new cohorts play a central role in the process
of structural transformation. We now formulate a heterogeneous agent overlapping
generations model of life-cycle career choice under switching costs and integrate it into
a canonical model of structural transformation. In the next section we use the model
to infer the nature of the adjustment costs and to perform several counterfactual
7Hendricks (2010) documents a similar facts for more detailed educational categories.
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exercises that highlight how structural transformation is a race between demographics
and technology.
2.3.1 Households
Demographics and cohorts
Because this paper is about the interaction between structural transformation and
demographics, we start by defining the demographic structure of our model economy.
The economy consists of a unit measure of households, that are made up of members
indexed by age h = 0, ..., H. Each year, a new cohort of size Nt(0) is born into each
household. The growth rate of these new cohorts is n > 0; cohorts aged H die with
certainty, and younger ones die with probability 0 ≤ δ < 1. The resulting law of
motion for cohort size by age is given by:
Nt (h) =

(1 + n)Nt−1 (0) h = 0
(1− δ)Nt−1 (h− 1) h = 1, . . . , H
. (2.2)
The total size of the household (equivalently, total size of the population) is given
by:
Nt =
H∑
h=0
Nt (h) . (2.3)
It also grows at rate n.
Preferences, consumption, and labor supply
The members of the household pool their income risk and maximize the present
discounted value of the household’s log consumption flow. The factor at which future
consumption is discounted is β and this present discounted value equals
∞∑
t=0
βt lnCt. (2.4)
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Here, following Ngai and Pissarides (2007a), the aggregate consumption level Ct
is a CES aggregate of consumption Ca,t, Cm,t and Cs,t from the agriculture, manufac-
turing, and services industries, with Ct given by:
Ct =
 ∑
i∈{a,m,s}
λiC
ε−1
ε
i,t
 εε−1 , where ε < 1. (2.5)
Here ε is the elasticity of substitution between the goods and services produced
by the three main sectors. It determines how quickly households change their con-
sumption patterns in response to trends in relative prices between sectors due to
structural transformation; Ngai and Pissarides (2007a) show that ε < 1 generates
trends in expenditure shares consistent with the data. The preference weights satisfy
λa + λm + λs = 1.
We use log preferences here such that the real interest rate implied by the house-
hold’s intertemporal choice, rt =
1
β
Ct+1
Ct
− 1, does not depend on population growth.
Therefore, household’s intertemporal choices are not affected by demographic factors.
This allows us to isolate the effect of demographics on the transitional dynamics re-
lated to the (re-)allocation and training of workers that is the result of structural
transformation.
Let pi,t for i ∈ {a,m, s} be the price of goods and services of sector i, expressed
in terms of units of the consumption aggregate Ct, which we use as our numeraire
good throughout. The demand for each type of good i ∈ {a,m, s} implied by the
CES preferences is
Ci,t = λ
ε
i
(
1
pi,t
)ε
Ct. (2.6)
The associated expenditure shares can be written as
si,t =
pi,tCi,t
Ct
= λεip
1−ε
i,t . (2.7)
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The assumption that ε < 1 is sufficient to ensure that si,t is increasing in pi,t,
which is consistent with cross-country evidence (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007a).
Households do not incur any disutility from working and so supply their labor
inelastically (as in Ngai and Pissarides, 2007a; Herrendorf et al., 2014b). We deviate
from this existing literature in allowing workers to make career choices subject to
training costs and retraining costs to switching between sectors. Since the introduc-
tion of these training frictions in the labor market is the main contribution of this
paper, we present them in a separate subsection below. Before that, however, it is
useful to first consider the firms’ decisions that determine the supply side and labor
demand schedules of our economy.
2.3.2 Firms
On the supply side of this economy, firms use labor as the only production factor.
The production technologies in each of the sectors i ∈ {a,m, s} are linear. We denote
output of each respective sector by Yi,t and the sectoral Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) by Ai,t, such that
Yi,t = Ai,tLi,t. (2.8)
where Li,t is the amount of labor used in production in sector i. Note that, because
workers differ in their productivity levels in this economy, Li,t is measured in terms
of efficiency units of labor. What makes this a model of structural transformation is
that we assume that the three sectors in the economy are subject to three different
rates of TFP growth, gi, such that
Ai,t = (1 + gi)Ai,t−1. (2.9)
Each of the three sectors is perfectly competitive in that firms are price and wage
takers, and that there is free entry. Free entry of firms occurs until price equals the
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average (and marginal) cost of production:
pi,t =
wi,t
Ai,t
. (2.10)
Here wi,t is the real wage paid per efficiency unit of labor in sector i ∈ {a,m, s} in
period t. An important difference between our model and other studies of structural
transformation is that we consider sector-specific labor markets. This is the reason
that wi,t is not equated across sectors and, hence, it is denoted by a subscript i.
2.3.3 Career Decisions and the Labor Supply
The reason that wages differ between sector-specific labor markets is that individ-
ual workers’ labor supply is not perfectly elastic across sectors. That is, individual
workers do not simply choose to work for the sector that pays the highest wage.
Instead, their sectoral choice is affected by three particular factors.
First, each worker receives an idiosyncratic sector-specific productivity shock zi,t
in each period. These shocks are drawn from an exponential distribution with mean
1. For notational purposes, we combine these three shocks in the vector, zt =
[za,t, zm,t, zs,t]
′.
Second, it is costly for individual workers to get trained to acquire the skills
necessary to work in a particular sector at the beginning of their career at age h = 0.
Finally, it is also costly for them to get retrained in case they decide to work in a
different sector mid-career at age h > 0. These latter two factors, i.e. the training
and retraining costs, are the labor market frictions that are the main focus and
contribution of this paper.
Both the training and retraining costs reflect that it takes workers time to initially
get trained to start their career in a particular sector and then to get retrained in
case they switch sectors. We capture these costs in terms of two parameters. The
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training-cost parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the period when the worker is of
age h = 0 that the worker spends on getting trained to work in a particular sector.
The retraining-cost parameter γh ∈ [0, 1] is age-specific and reflects the fraction of
a period that a worker spends on being retrained when he or she decides to switch
sectors of employment after the initial training at age h = 0.
Household members share their income and are fully insured against these costs.
Because of this, each individual worker chooses his or her career path to maximize the
expected present discounted value of lifetime earnings. At time t, this choice depends
on the worker’s age, h, industry of employment, i, and productivity shocks zt. The
expected present discounted value of net future lifetime earnings by the individual
equals Vt (i, h; zt).
Given that the workers make optimal career decisions to maximize their Vt (i, h; zt),
we can write the expected present discounted value of lifetime earnings as the fol-
lowing Bellman equations. At age h = 0 the worker is not employed in a particular
sector yet. She chooses an initial sector to start her career, taking into account the
productivity shocks zt and the fact that in order to get trained she will only work
a fraction (1− φ) of the first period of her career. The Bellman equation associated
with this choice reads
Vt (0; zt) = max
i∈{a,m,s}
{
(1− φ) zi,twi,t + 1− δ
1 + rt
EtVt+1 (i, 1; zt+1)
}
. (2.11)
Here rt is the real interest rate in period t and Et is the expectation conditional on
information available at time t. This expectation is over all possible realizations of
the worker-sector-specific productivity shocks, i.e. zt+1. The value function on the
left-hand side does not have a sector index here because workers are not yet employed
in a specific sector at the beginning of their career.
At age h > 0 the worker has started a career and the Bellman equation that
54
determines the value for a worker of age h employed in industry i in period t and
faced with productivity shocks zt is given by
Vt (i, h; zt) =

max
j∈{a,m,s}
{(1− I (j 6= i) γh) zj,twj,t + 1−δ1+rtEtVt+1 (j, h+ 1; zt+1)} if h = 1, . . . ,H − 1
max
j∈{a,m,s}
{(1− I (j 6= i) γh) zj,twj,t} if h = H
.
(2.12)
Here, the indicator function I (j 6= i) reflects that a worker spends a fraction γh of
her time on being retrained in the period when she decides to switch sectors and that
she does not have to spend any time on retraining if she remains in the same sector.
The latter case reflects that workers of age h = H die with certainty and, thus, do
not have a continuation value to their careers.
The result is that workers’ career decisions involve a dynamic discrete choice
problem. This discrete choice problem can be summarized in four variables that are
important for the equilibrium dynamics of the labor supply and, thus, the economy.
The first two of these variables have to do with workers’ training decisions at the
beginning of their career, at age h = 0. First is the probability that a worker of age
h = 0 is trained to work in sector i at time t, Φt (i). Second is the average number of
efficiency units of labor that these workers supply to sector i at time t, z˜t (i; 0). The
zero here denotes the age of the workers making the training decision.
The latter two variables are determined by the retraining decisions in period t,
which depend on the worker’s age h, the industry of employment i, and the produc-
tivity shocks, zt. The first is the probability that a worker of age h > 0 who works in
sector i at time t decides to get retrained and starts working in sector j, Γt (i, j;h).
The other variable is the average productivity level for working in sector j of workers
of age h who switch from sector i to j in period t, z˜t (i, j;h).
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The assumption that the idiosyncratic sector-worker-time specific productivity
shocks have exponential distributions allows us to solve Φt (i), z˜t (i; 0), Γt (i, j;h),
and z˜t (i, j;h) in closed form as a function of the wages in each of the sectors and the
continuation values of working in each of the sectors. These closed-form solutions are
algebraically intense and we therefore leave them for Section B.4 in the Appendix.
What is important in the rest of our analysis is that these four variables are sufficient
to describe the dynamic evolution of the labor supply in our model.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
Product markets
Because output is only used for consumption, product market equilibrium requires
Yi,t = Ci,t, for i ∈ {a,m, s}. (2.13)
Through the inverse demand function implied by (2.6), this determines the relative
prices as a function of relative demands as
pi,t = λi
(
Ct
Ci,t
) 1
ε
= λi
(
Yt
Yi,t
) 1
ε
. (2.14)
where we define aggregate output as Yt = Ct.
Labor markets
Free entry of producers drives down the price to equal the average cost of production,
which, using (2.10) and (2.14), determines real wages as a function of relative output
levels, Yi,t, and TFP levels, Ai,t:
wi,t = Ai,tpi,t = Ai,tλi
(
Yt
Yi,t
) 1
ε
. (2.15)
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Using the production functions, (2.8), we can write this expression for the real wages
in terms of labor inputs and relative productivity levels
wi,t = λiA
ε−1
ε
i,t
(∑
j λjA
ε−1
ε
j,t L
ε−1
ε
j,t
) 1
ε−1
L
1
ε
i,t
. (2.16)
These are the inverse labor demand functions that determine how many efficiency
units of labor firms will hire at given real wages and productivity levels.
If labor markets were frictionless and labor was homogenous then the labor supply
for each sector would be perfectly elastic. As a result wi,t = wt, as in canonical
models of structural transformation. Here the dynamics of the labor market are more
complicated because the labor supply depends not only on current wages, but also
on past and current career decisions of workers, which in turn depend on past and
future wages.
In fact, because it is costly for workers to get trained to work in different sectors,
the age-industry structure of the labor supply in this economy is a state variable whose
law of motion is determined by demographics and the career decisions of workers. We
derive the law of motion of the labor supply in three steps. In the first, we follow how
many workers of age h work in sector i at time t. We denote this number by Et (i;h).
In the second step, we consider how many efficiency units of labor these workers
supply, based on their endogenous, career choices. In the final step, we aggregate
these efficiency units over workers of all ages to get the aggregate labor supply for
each sector i at time t.
The number of workers of age h = 0 who work in sector i at time t is equal to the
number of persons of age h = 0 at time t, i.e. Nt (0), times the fraction of them who
decide to get trained to work in sector i, i.e. Φt (i). Thus,
Et (i; 0) = Φt (i)Nt (0) . (2.17)
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The number of workers of age h > 0 who work in sector i at time t, Et (i;h) is
equal to the number of workers of age h − 1 who worked in the sector a period ago
and didn’t die, (1 − δ)Et−1 (i;h− 1), times the share of them who do not switch
sectors, Γt (i, i;h), plus the sum of the workers of age h − 1 who worked in other
sectors in period t − 1 that survived and decided to switch to sector i in period t.
Mathematically, the boils down to
Et (i;h) =
∑
j∈{a,m,s}
(1− δ)Γt (j, i;h)Et−1 (j;h− 1) , for h = 1, . . . , H. (2.18)
The 3× (H + 1)-dimensional tuple, {Et (i;h)}i,h is the state variable in this economy
that determines the labor supply.
This state variable is measured in terms of numbers of workers. The labor inputs
for each sector, Li,t, are measured in terms of efficiency units of labor instead. The
labor supply can be transformed from number of workers into efficiency units of labor
by multiplying the number of workers by their average productivity level that depends
on their career choice and by the net (of training and retraining time) number of hours
that these workers supply. To do this, we denote the number of efficiency units of
labor supplied to sector i by workers of age h in period t by Lst (i;h). This allows us
to write
Lst (i; 0) = (1− φ) z˜t (i; 0) Φt (i)Nt (0) , (2.19)
and
Lst (i;h) =
∑
j∈{a,m,s}
(1− I (j 6= i) γ) z˜t(1−δ) (j, i;h) Γt (j, i;h)Et−1 (j;h− 1) , for h = 1, . . . ,H.
(2.20)
These equations define the industry-age-specific labor supply curves, in terms of
efficiency units of labor.
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Equilibrium in the labor market is when the sector-specific real wages, wi,t, adjust
such that the total number of efficiency units of labor demanded in a sector, i.e. Li,t,
equals the aggregate supply of efficiency units of labor to this sector. That is,
Li,t =
∑
h=0,...,H
Lst (i;h) . (2.21)
Here, the left-hand side variable depends on the real wages through the inverse labor
demand function, (2.16), while the right-hand side variables depend on the real wages
through the workers’ career choices.
2.4 The Impact of (Re-)Training Costs
In this section we consider the impact of (re-)training costs on the equilibrium
dynamics of our model. We do so by comparing the dynamic equilibrium path of our
economy with such costs with a baseline case in which such costs are not present.
We call this baseline case the Flexible Benchmark. We illustrate the impact of (re-
)training costs in four steps.
First, we describe the main properties of the equilibrium of the Flexible Bench-
mark case. This case is very similar to the model introduced in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel
(2018) and we discuss the similarities as well as emphasize the properties that are
important to understand when we add (re-)training costs for workers. The most im-
portant property of the flexible benchmark is relative wages in the service sector are
increasing compared to those in manufacturing and agriculture.
Next, we show that retraining costs accelerate the process of structural trans-
formation in the economy rather than slow it down. We do so with an example in
which retraining costs are the same for workers of all ages (flat retraining costs). The
counterintuitive result that retraining costs accelerate structural transformation is
because there is an option value to working in the service sector in anticipation of fu-
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ture wage gains. This option value is higher for young than for old workers. Because
of this, under flat retraining costs the model has the counterfactual implication that
older workers disproportionately switch back from the service sector to agriculture
and manufacturing.
In the third step of this section we show that the absence of such career switchbacks
in the data implies that, in the context of our model, retraining costs need to be
increasing in age.
Finally, we explain why retraining costs in this model mainly affect the trends in
relative wages across sectors rather than the trends in employment shares. This is a
consequence of the near-Leontief preferences in the parameterization of our model.
The fact that sectoral employment shares are not affected much by retraining costs
does not mean that these costs have not effect on output. We show that retraining
costs reduce output in for two reasons. The first is that they siphon off labor from
production into training. The second is that they distort the workers labor supply
decisions reducing the efficiency units of labor employed in each sector.
2.4.1 Flexible Benchmark and Solution Method
Flexible Benchmark
Throughout the rest of this section we use the case in which there are no (re-)training
costs, i.e. φ = γh = 0 for h = 1, . . . , H, as our main baseline for comparison.
This flexible benchmark is a useful baseline because it is similar to the transitional
dynamics studied in other analyses of structural transformation. Most notably, our
flexible benchmark is very similar to the equilibrium dynamics in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel
(2018).
When workers do not face any training or retraining costs, their period-by-period
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labor supply decision in this model simply involves choosing to work in the sector i
that pays the maximum compensation given their idiosyncratic productivity draws,
zi,twi,t. Thus, in this case, workers’ career choices neither depend on their future
career opportunities, nor on their initial industry of employment, nor on their age.
Moreover, because we have abstracted from capital as a factor of production, the level
of output per worker is also not affected by the population growth rate and workers’
life expectancy. This means that we use the this baseline to consider how workers’
career decisions change relative to it when workers face (re-)training costs and how the
aggregate level of output per worker is affected by these changes in career decisions.
Because we rely on numerical methods for our analysis, we have to choose a set
of baseline parameters to evaluate the dynamics of the flexible benchmark. Following
Ngai and Pissarides (2008a), we choose ε = 0.1, which is in the range of estimates
implied by postwar U.S. national income data. We discipline our choice of the other
parameters by having the flexible benchmark match the historical U.S. employment
shares in agriculture, manufacturing, and services at the beginning and end of our
sample, i.e. 1870 and 2010. We also match the average annualized historical growth
rate of real GDP per capita over the sample. This calibration is described in more
detail in Appendix B.5. We transform the annualized parameters in our model to
reflect the length of a period which we set to 10 years.
The demographic parameters, i.e. the population growth rate, n, and the mortal-
ity rate, δ, do not matter for equilibrium in the flexible benchmark. Thus, we cannot
use the flexible benchmark path to quantitatively discipline them. Instead, we choose
n to match the average annual population growth rate in the U.S. between 1870 and
2010 and δ to match the average annual mortality rate for persons aged 10-70 born
between 1904 and 1942 from Carter et al. (2006). In addition, we set the discount
factor to β = 0.95 (annualized).
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We assume that persons live for 6 periods in our model, i.e. H = 5. Given the
period length of 10 years, one can interpret this as covering individuals from age 10
through 70 (similar to the data we analyzed).
The equilibrium path of our economy in the flexible benchmark closely resembles
that of the model introduced in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018).8 The main difference is
that the labor supply in our model is made up of cohorts of workers who make lifetime
career decisions. These career decisions, and how they compare to the evidence we
presented in Section 2.2 is what we focus on here.
In the flexible benchmark, the choice of the sector that pays the highest compen-
sation does not depend on a worker’s age. As a result, all cohorts make the same
career decisions. Panels (i) - (a) through (c) from Figure 2.3 show this. The are the
model-equivalent of Figure 2.1. Contrary to the data, in the flexible benchmark the
fraction of workers that are employed in each sector is the same across cohorts. This
is why the lines in the panels in row (i) of Figure 2.3 overlap.
This also shows that the changes in employment shares across sectors are the
same across cohorts in the benchmark. Table 2.3 reports the between-cohort share
from the ANOVA of the changes of aggregate employment shares for three model
specifications. These are the model-equivalent of Table 2.1, and the first row shows
it for the flexible benchmark. These between-cohort shares are much lower than in
the data. Even though all cohorts make the same career decisions, the between share
is not zero. This is because average employment patterns over their life cycle differ
across cohorts because they are alive during different periods.
Panel (a) of row (i) of Figure 2.4 shows the trends in the relative (log) wages
across sectors that drive workers’ career decisions. In the flexible benchmark wages
in agriculture initially exceed those in manufacturing and services. Most importantly,
8We illustrate this using a detailed set of results in Appendix B.6
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Table 2.3: ANOVA in Different Model Specifications
Total By Industry
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
(i) Flexible benchmark
φ = 0, γh = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
Share Between Cohorts 18% 18% 18% 18%
(ii) Flat retraining costs
φ = 0.65, γh = {.5, .5, .5, .5, .5}
Share Between Cohorts 53% 24% 66% -5%
(iii) Increasing retraining costs
φ = 0.65, γh = {.5, .5, .5, .9, .999}
Share Between Cohorts 20% 45% 23% 52%
relative wages in the service sector increase over time. This is driven by the increase in
the relative price of services along the transitional path of this economy. As Ngai and
Pissarides (2007a) point out, the complementarity of the goods and services produced
by the three sectors in this economy and the relatively low productivity growth results
in an increase in the relative price of services (and an increase in the share of value
added) along the transitional path.
Two other effects reduce the trend in relative wages in services. The first is the low
productivity growth in services, which puts downward pressure on real wage growth
in the service sector. The second is the selection of workers into the service sector.
Consistent with the evidence provided in Young (2014), workers of increasingly low
average productivity are drawn into services. That is, z˜s, t declines over time. These
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workers are drawn into the service sector by the increase in relative wages driven
by the different productivity growth rates and resulting relative price trends across
sectors. This downward trend in labor quality in the service sector also puts downward
pressure on the growth rate of average labor productivity (per worker).
On net, however, the productivity and worker-selection effects are smaller than
the relative price effect. As a result, in this economy real wages in the sector with
the lowest productivity growth grow the fastest.
Panel (b) of row (i) of Figure 2.4, for h = 1, . . . , H, shows the covariance between
the within-cohort and aggregate changes in employment shares, normalized by the
variance of the aggregate changes. This ratio, from (2.1), is the regression coefficient
of a regression of the age-specific changes in the employment shares on the aggregate
changes in the employment shares. Because the career profiles of each cohort change in
lockstep with the aggregate distribution of employment, these regression coefficients
are 1 for all cohorts in the flexible benchmark. This stands in stark contrast to the
variation in the data we documented in Figure 2.2
Thus, compared to the data, the flexible benchmark generates much less between-
cohort variation in career profiles. Moreover, in the absence of (re-)training costs,
changes in each cohort’s career profile follows that of the overall economy, which is
not the case in the data.
Implementation of Extended Path method
Because workers’ career choices in the flexible benchmark do not depend on their
previous decisions or age, the flexible benchmark case does not have a state variable
and can be solved relatively straighforwardly on a period-by-period basis. In the
presence of retraining costs, however, the equilibrium path of this economy depends
on the initial age-industry distribution of the labor supply, {E0 (i;h)}i,h.
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This equilibrium path can be reduced to a path of (real) wages in each of the
sectors, {wi,t}i,t that, at each point in time, equates the demand and supply in each
of the three labor markets. When the wages result in equilibrium in the labor market,
Walras’ Law implies that the product market will be in equilibrium as well. Because
the equilibrium depends on the complicated evolution of the age-industry distribution
of the labor supply, which in turn is determined by the workers’ dynamic discrete
career choices, it is not possible to find a closed-form solution for the equilibrium
path. Instead, we have to resort to numerical methods.
The solution method that we use, described in Section B.7 of the Appendix, is
an application of the “Extended-Path ”method, which was first discussed in Fair and
Taylor (1983) and applied in, for example, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and
Hobijn et al. (2006). Normally, the extended path method solves the transtional
dynamics of a model between one steady state in period t = 0 and another at t = T .
Because our model does not have a steady state or balanced growth path, we use a
slightly different approach.
We solve the transitional dynamics of our model economy over the period from
t = −t˜l through t = T + t˜r. We assume that the initial state of the economy, at
t = −t˜l, is the one from our flexible benchmark. Moreover, we assume that the
economy is on a balanced growth path, in which all sectors grow at the same rate,
with no (re-)training costs after t = T + t˜r. The reason that we add the left- and
right-padding, i.e. t˜l > 0 and t˜r > 0, to the solution path is to reduce the impact
of the assumed initial and final conditions on the part of the solution path, namely
t = 0, . . . , T , that we focus on.
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2.4.2 Retraining Costs Accelerate Structural Transformation
The first thing we illustrate is that the addition of retraining costs to the model ac-
celerates rather than slows down the process of structural transformation, as captured
by the shift in employment from agriculture through manufacturing to services.
We illustrate this property of the model for a case with flat retraining costs. In
particular, we look at the case where φ = 0.65 and γh = 0.5 for all h = 1, . . . , H.
Under the restriction of flat retraining costs, i.e. γh = γ for h = 1, . . . , H, this
combination of parameters gets the closest to the between share for the United States
reported in Table 2.1 and the cohort-career regression coefficients shown in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the difference between the path of the sectoral employment
shares in the flexible benchmark (hashed bars) and in the case with flat retraining
costs. It shows that the employment shares of manufacturing and services in the early
stages of the structural transformation are higher under the retraining costs than in
the flexible benchmark. At first glance, this might seem like a very counterintuitive
result, because we tend to think of adjustment costs slowing down adjustments rather
than accelerating them.
The reason for this acceleration is that, when workers face retraining costs, career
choices do not only depend on current (real) wages, wi,t, but also on the career con-
tinuation values, 1
1+rt
EtVt+1 (i, 1; zt+1). These continuation values reflect the option
of being employed in a particular sector. This option value is particularly high in
our model for the service sector, because it largely captures the present discounted
value of the future increases in relative wages in the service sector over the rest of a
worker’s career. As a result, workers facing retraining costs choose to be employed in
the service sector more than those that do not face retraining costs. They do so in
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anticipation of future relative wage increases in services.9
In equilibrium, this increase in the labor supply in services results in higher em-
ployment in the service sector. It also subdues the trend in relative wages in the
service sector compared to the flexible benchmark. This can be seen by comparing
Panels (a) of rows (i) and (ii) of Figure 2.4. What happens is that retraining costs
reduce the gross flows of workers between sectors that are largely driven by their
idiosyncratic productivity levels. They, however, result inlarger net flows of workers
across sectors that are coordinated by the common career continuation values that
the workers face.
The younger the worker, the higher this option value, and the more the worker’s
decision is driven by it. The result is that older workers put more weight on current
wages and productivity shocks when they make their labor supply decisions. For
example, an old worker in services that draws a high productivity shock, i.e. gets
a good opportunity in manufacturing or agriculture, will switch back to one of the
shrinking sectors with declining relative wages in the economy. This can be seen from
the three panels in the second row of Figure 2.3. The left and middle panels show
the cohort-specific employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing. The career
switchbacks of older workers are reflected by the increases in these shares in the last
two periods of each cohort’s career. These increases are offset by a decline in the
share of workers in services. Higher wage gaps between manufacturing (as well as
agriculture) and services imply higher career option values. Higher wage gaps also
make switchbacks more common. This is why their size increases in Figure 2.3 over
the transition path.10
9Note that this result does not depend on our assumption of per-period independent idiosyncratic
shocks the career continuation values also matter in case of persistent shocks.
10The career switchbacks are the result of our assumption that workers are subject to sector-
specific productivity shocks each period. In our model these shocks are independent over time.
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2.4.3 Retraining Costs Increase with Age
Comparing the three panels in the second row of Figure 2.3 with those in Figure
2.1, it is clear that the career switchbacks that the model generates are counterfactual.
In order for them not to occur in our model, we need to assume that retraining costs
are higher for older workers. These costs need to increase so that they offset the
decline in the career option value of workers in shrinking sectors.
To illustrate the effect of increasing retraining costs over the life cycle, we increase
the retraining costs for workers of age h = 4 and h = 5 to γ4 = 0.9 and γ5 = 0.999.
This makes it very costly for older workers to change their sectors of employment,
and greatly reduces career switchbacks. We call this the increasing retraining costs
case and its equilibrium path is plotted in Row (iii) of Figures 2.3 and 2.4. This is
an extreme example. However, it shows that with late-career high retraining costs,
career option values play a larger role. Workers move more rapidly from manufac-
turing to services in anticipation of future relative wage increases. This is, at least
qualitatively, more consistent with the cohort career employment patterns depicted
in Figure 2.1. Our data of consecutive cross-sections does not allow us to consider
individual employment transitions by workers, but evidence in Menzio et al. (2016)
suggests that these transitions are, indeed, declining over the life cycle.
Note, however, that with more workers lining up in services the equilibrium trend
of relative wages is lower, compared to the flexible benchmark and flat retraining
costs cases. The left panel of Row (i) of Figure 2.4 shows this. It is most evident
from the real wages in agriculture: in the flexible benchmark these were declining
after 40 years, and with increasing retraining costs, these continue to increase. In
If they weren’t, highly correlated shocks over time or across sectors would imply smaller career
switchbacks.
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fact, the difference in real wages in agriculture at the end of the quarter millennium
that we consider is 200 log points. That is about a 700 percent difference. In fact,
most of the impact of retraining costs is not on the employment shares but on the
relative wages across sectors.
2.4.4 Bulk of Impact of Retraining Costs Through Relative Wages
The reason that most of the adjustment to retraining costs in this economy goes
through relative wages is that preferences are almost Leontief. As is commonly done
in studies of structural transformation (e.g. Ngai and Pissarides, 2008a), we have
chosen a very low elasticity of substitution between the goods and services produced
by the sectors in the economy, i.e. ε = 0.1. This elasticity is consistent with the
trends in relative prices and value added shares of the three sectors in U.S. time
series.
It implies, however, that the marginal rates of substitution between Ci,t for i ∈
{a,m, s} vary a lot in response to small changes in the quantities. These marginal
rates of substitution affect the relative wages in this economy because they determine
the elasticities of the sector-specific labor demand curves. The smaller ε the less elastic
the labor demand curves. The inelastic labor demand curves mean that changes in
the labor supply mainly result in changes in relative wages rather than changes in
sectoral employment shares.11
Figure 2.6 illustrates this for period t = 50. It shows the sector-specific labor
supply and labor demand curves under the flexible benchmark (dashed) and frictional
increasing retraining costs (solid). The downward sloping labor demand curves are
11In the limiting case of Leontief preferences in which ε ↓ 0 labor demand (in efficiency units) is
pinned down completely by technology parameters and all the effect of retraining costs on the labor
supply is reflected in changes in relative wages rather than employment shares.
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very inelastic (close to vertical) and do not move much due to the changes in the
wages in the other sectors from the flexible to the frictional case. The result is that
the equilibrium employment shares do not change a lot between the flexible and
frictional case. The shifts in the labor supply curves induced by the retraining costs
therefore translate mostly into changes in the equilibrium real wages.
2.4.5 Output Losses Due to Retraining and Allocation of Labor
The fact that retraining costs do not affect sectoral employment shares much
does not mean, however, that these costs do not affect the level of output in the
economy. Output in the case of increasing retraining costs is much lower under
increasing retraining costs than in the flexible benchmark for two reasons. The first
is the loss in effective labor input due to the (re-)training time of workers. The
dashed purple line in Figure 2.7 shows the size of the gap in output between the
increasing costs and flexible benchmark cases due to (re-)training in log points over
the transition path.
At the beginning of the transition path, the (re-)training costs result in a loss of
more than a third of output. In large part, this is due to the training costs, φ, that
all workers incur when they start their career. In addition, this reflects the retraining
time of workers that switch sectors.12 Note that this loss declines as more workers
are employed in services and fewer gross flows of workers occur between sectors. At
the end of the transition path, training time absorbs about a quarter of the time
available from all workers, which is mainly due to the training cost of workers in the
12The level of these costs in this model is relatively high because the variance of the Exponential
distribution of workers’ idiosyncratic productivity shocks is one. That is, the size of this loss is
partly driven by our distributional assumption about workers’ productivity shocks that keeps the
discrete choice problem of workers tractable and solvable.
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first period of their lives, i.e. because φ = 0.65.
The second reason for the output loss has to do with the allocation of workers
across sectors. (Re-)training costs can have a worker choosing to go into services when
her current productivity (and wage) is higher in manufacturing or agriculture. This
is due to the option value of going into services. The solid line, labeled “Total”in
Figure 2.7 adds this effect on output on top of that for the training time to show
the total output loss in the increasing retraining costs case compared to the flexible
benchmark.
The part due to the allocation of labor, i.e. the difference between the two lines,
peaks after about 30 years at around 15 percent and then declines as the employ-
ment distribution shifts towards services. Thus, because (re-)training costs affect
the allocation of workers across sectors they reduce average labor productivity in
this economy. This effect eventually goes to zero when all workers are employed in
services.
In sum, in the long run retraining costs result in about a 20 percent reduction
in output, solely due to the training of young workers to prepare them for careers
in the service sector. However, during the process of structural transformation, the
retraining time involved with the reallocation of workers across as well as workers’
forward-looking career decisions double this impact. That is, the total output loss
peaks after 30 years at around 40 percent of the level of output in the flexible bench-
mark.
2.4.6 Unanticipated Acceleration of Structural Transformation
The insight that most of the impact of retraining costs in a canonical model of
structural transformation is on wages instead of employment shares is important also
for understanding the effect of an unanticipated acceleration in structural transforma-
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tion. We illustrate this using a scenario in which the economy is on the same path as
in the previous subsections for flexible benchmark and the increasing retraining costs
cases. At time t = 0 structural transformation unexpectedly accelerates in that both
ga and gm permanently increase by 50 percent compared to their calibrated values.
13
Figure 2.8 plots the changes in the paths of the employment shares and the log of
the average real wage paid per employee by sector. The two panels in Row (i) of the
figure show the results for the flexible benchmark and the panels in Row (ii) for the
increasing retraining costs.
The left panels in each of these rows show the change in the employment shares by
sector over the post-shock equilibrium path of the economy. Both panels show how an
increase in ga and gm results in a faster reallocation of labor from the agriculture and
manufacturing sectors to services. For the reasons we already explained in subsection
2.4.4 above, the impact of the acceleration in technological change on the employment
transition patterns is very similar for both cases.
The impact of the shock differs mostly in terms of the paths of the sectoral wages
in the two cases. This can be seen by comparing the right-hand side panels in Rows
(i) and (ii) of Figure 2.8. To understand the impact of the shock on wages under
retraining costs it is important to distinguish between the initial impact and the
subsequent dynamics.
In the absence of the retraining costs there is no initial impact of the shock on
wages because it does not affect the sectoral productivity levels, Ai,0 for i ∈ {a,m, s}.
The presence of retraining costs makes more younger workers line up in services
in anticipation of future wage gains in that sector in response to the shock. This
increases the labor supply in services at the time of the shock and lowers real wages
13That is, ga increases from 0.045 (annualized) to 0.0675 and gm from 0.020 to 0.030.
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in the service sector.14 For young workers, this decline in the wage in the service
sector at t = 0 is offset by subsequent increases in expected earnings later on in their
careers. For older workers employed in the service sector at the time of the shock, this
decline in the real wage is not offset by future wage increases and, in hindsight, some
of these workers would have preferred to be employed in agriculture or manufacturing
but are stuck in the service sector due to their high retraining costs when the shock
occurs.
In the subsequent periods the shock results in a higher increase in the growth rate
of real wages in the service sector than in the other two sectors. In this sense, it results
in a stagnation of relative wage growth in agriculture and manufacturing. In the first
5 decades after the shock, this stagnation is more profound for the case of increasing
retraining costs when the allocation of workers across sectors is still affected by the
initial allocation at the time of the shock. In the longer-run retraining costs dampen
the effect of the shock on relative real wage growth across sectors for the same reason
that they dampen the trends in relative wages in the left-hand side panels in Figure
2.4. This can be seen from the very different scales on the vertical axes of the two
right-hand side panels in Figure 2.8.
2.5 Conclusion
Using data on sectoral employment patterns by birth cohort from more than 50
countries around the world, we show that the bulk of the shift in the allocation of
employment across major sectors of economic activity that is typical for structural
transformation is because younger cohorts are disproportionately employed in grow-
ing sectors. We argue that the importance of between-cohort differences in sectoral
14Most of these workers turn out to be drawn out of the agriculture sector, which is where wages
increase in response to the shock.
73
employment shares is indicative of workers incurring substantial retraining costs when
they switch sectors.
To illustrate the aggregate implications of such retraining costs, we introduce
a model of structural transformation with overlapping generations that face (re-
)training costs when they make their labor supply decisions. On the aggregate level,
we follow Ngai and Pissarides (2007a) and we model structural transformation as
being driven by different levels of TFP growth across sectors. These sectors produce
different types of output that are gross complements in aggregate CES preferences
and drive demand patterns.
Our main theoretical contribution is modeling the career decisions of different
cohorts as a discrete choice problem. In each period workers decide what sector they
would like to work in based on their current productivity levels, the future wage
prospects in each of the sectors, and the potential retraining costs they incur.
To match the between-cohort contribution to structural transformation in our
model, we need to include substantial training costs for workers at the beginning of
their careers and retraining costs when they switch sectors. We obtain four important
insights from our model once we introduce (re-)training costs.
First of all, (re-)training costs accelerate the reallocation of labor to the growing
service sector rather than slow it down. This is because workers decide to take jobs
in the service sector in anticipation of future relative wage increases.
Secondly, because there is no option value to being in services for workers at
the end of their careers, some of these move back to agriculture and manufacturing.
These counterfactual career switchbacks in the model suggest that retraining costs
are increasing in age and very high for old workers.
Thirdly, the strong gross complementarity of the goods and services produced by
the three sectors in our economy results in the bulk of the impact of the retraining
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costs being on trends in relative wages across sectors rather than trends in employment
shares.
Finally, when structural transformation accelerates unexpectedly more young work-
ers will choose to supply their labor in the service sector in anticipation of future
relative wage growth in services. This reduces the service sector wage on impact of
the shock which most negatively affects the career earnings outlook of older workers
in the service sector. In the longer-run the shock reduces relative wages in agriculture
and manufacturing.
Our main contribution here is the analysis of the evolution of the labor supply
across cohorts in a general equilibrium framework. To isolate the effects of the as-
sumptions we made about the labor supply, we deliberately embed our cohort-specific
labor supply model in a simple model of structural transformation. This, deliberately
stylized, framework reveals potentially large effects of labor market frictions, generally
ignored in models of economic growth, on long-run economic outcomes.
The reallocation of labor due to structural transformation is only one of the poten-
tial applications of our theoretical contribution. For example, it can also be used to
consider the cohort-specific effects of the labor market impacts of trade (Autor et al.,
2013, e.g.). As is common in models of economic growth, we have abstracted from
workers’ participation and retirement decisions. Adding those margins is a useful
extension and the subject of future research.
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Figure 2.4: Wages and Cohort career profiles in three model specifications
(i) Flexible benchmark, φ = 0, γh = 0 for h = 1, . . . , 5
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(ii) Flat retraining costs, φ = 0.65, γh = 0.5 for h = 1, . . . , 5
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(iii) Increasing retraining costs, φ = 0.65, γh = {.5, .5, .5, .9, .999}
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Note: Years are plotted on the horizontal axis. t = 0 is the equivalent of the beginning of our data
sample, i.e. 1870, and t = 140 is the equivalent of 2010. Age is measured in decades.
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Figure 2.5: Sectoral employment shares in flexible benchmark and under flat retrain-
ing costs
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Figure 2.6: Sectoral labor supply and labor demand curves at t = 50
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Figure 2.7: Difference in output levels between increasing retraining costs and flexible
benchmark
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sample, i.e. 1870, and t = 140 is the equivalent of 2010. Gap is measured in terms of log points.
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Chapter 3
WORLD POLARIZATION
3.1 Introduction
Job polarization is happening in the developed world. This is a fact that economists
in labor and macroeconomics have documented.1 In this paper, I present new stylized
facts about the distribution of occupations in the world. With this, I expand cur-
rent analyses of job polarization beyond a group of developed economies. I analyze
a sample of 119 countries covering all levels of economic development to argue that
job polarization is a global phenomenon.
Job polarization is concerned with the “hollowing out” of the employment dis-
tribution: occupations in the middle of the wage distribution decreasing their em-
ployment shares, while the shares for the occupations with higher and lower wages
increase. These changes have been linked to the tasks that these occupations perform,
resulting in three large groups: abstract, routine, and manual occupations. Abstract
occupations mainly perform tasks requiring problem-solving, creativity, and persua-
sion typical of professional, managerial, and technical occupations. These occupations
earn the highest wages, on average. Routine occupations perform tasks that follow
well understood procedures, which makes them more susceptible to automation. Of-
fice clerks, and plant and machine operators are typical of this group of occupations,
whose wages are in the middle of the wage distribution. The last group, manual
occupations, perform tasks that require situational adaptability, visual recognition,
1See, for instance, Autor and Dorn (2013); Beaudry et al. (2016); Corte´s (2016); Goos et al.
(2014).
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and in-person interactions. Typical examples are occupations performing personal
services, domestic and office cleaning, and construction and installation services.2
This polarization in labor markets has important implications for earnings, in-
come distribution, and human capital. Job polarization is accompanied by wage
polarization: wages in routine occupations have decreased compared to the other
occupations (Firpo et al., 2011). This polarizes the distribution of income, since rou-
tine occupations are in the middle of the wage distribution. Human capital has a
strong occupation specific component (Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). Therefore,
changes in the occupational mix of the economy could lead to losses in accumulated
human capital. These are all topics studied in the context of polarization. The scope
of this paper, however, is on the employment distributions, and their evolution over
time.
The two main stylized facts that I uncover are as follows. First, at any point
in time, there is a strong link between a country’s development level (measured by
its real income per worker) and its occupational employment shares. This is what I
call the occupational development profile. Second, and more importantly, this profile
has shifted over time, resulting in world polarization: a lower routine development
profile, coupled with higher manual and abstract development profiles. These facts are
important because they portray how modern economic growth has affected the world
distribution of occupations. This confirms that polarization is a global phenomenon.
Put differently, world polarization implies lower employment shares in routine
occupations at all levels of development, increasing those in manual and abstract
occupations. Take the cases of Spain and Peru: In 1985, Spain had a real income
level comparable to Peru in 2014. Back then, Spain had a routine employment share of
38 percent, while Peru, 30 years later, had an employment share 11 percentage points
2For this paper, I borrow the classification from Corte´s et al. (2014).
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lower. The modern growth experience, then, is biased against routine occupations.
This finding contrasts to the results in the structural transformation literature.
The link between income and employment shares is a stable one.3 Industries and
occupations are closely related, so it would be tempting to argue that the link between
development levels and occupational employment shares should also be stable. The
data in this paper reveals otherwise.
Having a global perspective on polarization is useful in discerning among its causes.
The polarization analyses so far have identified two main explanations: international
trade and technical change (see, for example Goos and Manning (2007) & Autor
and Dorn (2013)). International trade, and outsourcing routine employment from
developed to developing countries would decrease the routine employment share in
developed countries, while increasing it in developing countries. Polarization is hap-
pening at all levels of development, and also within industries. This means that an
explanation based on technical change fits the patterns in the data better.
To analyze these development patterns, I follow the grouping principle for occupa-
tions and develop a polarization accounting framework at the task level. This serves
two purposes. First, it allows to quantify the differences in task-specific productivi-
ties. This is important to determine the technological forces behind the occupational
distributions. Second, it allows to study the process of technical change at a global
level.
The main finding of this exercise is that technical change has been biased against
routine occupations and biased in favor of manual occupations. Around the world,
productivity growth has been highest in routine tasks, which makes workers to switch
to different occupations. Productivity growth in abstract occupations has been the
lowest, which goes in line with Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol, 1967).
3See Herrendorf et al. (2014a) for a discussion.
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These technological trends imply that as countries continue to develop, we can
expect lower employment shares in routine occupations, and higher in manual occu-
pations, worldwide. Through a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, I forecast the
path of productivity growth, and conclude that world polarization will continue. In
the following years, then, the development profile for routine occupations will keep
decreasing, and the profile for manual occupations will keep increasing.
This paper is organized as follows. The first part discusses how the world dis-
tribution of occupations changed between 1980 and 2014. The second one analyzes
these changes through a polarization accounting framework, and forecasts its changes
until 2050.
3.2 World Polarization Through the Lens of Occupational Development Profiles
To expand the sample of analyses of job polarization beyond the developed coun-
tries previously studied, I use two data sources with comparable occupational in-
formation: the International Labor Organization’s ILOSTAT database, and census
microdata from the IPUMS International Project. The result is an unbalanced panel
of 119 countries, with an average period length of 19.4 years.4
The developed economies analyzed in Autor et al. (2003) and Goos et al. (2014)
are relatively similar, which allowed for a simple comparison of employment shares
without specifically taking into account their level of development. The countries I
analyze are much more heterogeneous in their stages of development and occupational
employment shares. In my broad sample it is thus important to study the link between
the level of development and the occupational distribution of employment. To capture
this link, I introduce the concept of the occupational development profile and use it
4The details of the data handling process are left to appendix C.1. All the results I report are
qualitatively similar for unbalanced panel that I discuss here in the main text and a balanced panel.
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to analyze polarization at the global level. The following subsection explains this
concept in more detail.
Occupational Development Profiles
As countries develop, economic activity is reallocated across productive sectors (in-
dustries). This is one of the characteristics of modern economic growth, according
to Kuznets (1973). More recent studies, like Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and Her-
rendorf et al. (2014a), confirm that this reallocation still holds for industries across
various countries.
Kuznets’ observations, however, also refer to changes in the occupational status of
labor. This is the counterpart of this stylized fact for the distribution of employment
across occupations. With this in mind, I refer to occupational development profiles as
the link between development levels and occupational employment shares.
More precisely, I define dj,t, the occupational development profile in occupation j
and time t, as a function that relates a level of income y to its expected employment
share in occupation j:
dj,t(y) = β0,j,t + β1,j,ty + β2,j,ty
2 (3.1)
I estimate the parameters through ordinary least squares regressions, and table 3.1
presents the estimates for 1985 and 2014. Income levels correspond to the real, PPP
adjusted GDP per worker relative to the U.S. level in 2000.5 This measure is intended
to be comparable over countries and time. Since development profiles reflect cross-
sectional data, these are the snapshots, at a point in time, linking the development
process to its occupational employment shares. For the regression analyses, this is
expressed in logarithmic terms, base 2.
5This reference point is the same throughout the analysis. This means that the U.S. series will
only have a level of 1 in 2000.
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Table 3.1: Occupational Development Profiles: 1985 & 2014
1985 2014
Abstract Routine Manual Abstract Routine Manual
Constant
33.984∗∗∗ 48.285∗∗∗ 17.731∗∗∗ 42.660∗∗∗ 29.434∗∗∗ 27.906∗∗∗
(3.103) (3.897) (6.089) (1.194) (0.831) (1.360)
Income
7.679∗∗∗ 4.369 -12.047∗∗ 10.762∗∗∗ -0.963 -9.799∗∗∗
(2.284) (2.868) (4.481) (1.234) (0.859) (1.406)
Income2
0.417 -0.460 0.043 0.706∗∗∗ -0.999∗∗∗ 0.294
(0.370) (0.465) (0.727) (0.260) (0.181) (0.296)
N 29 29 29 119 119 119
R2 0.773 0.802 0.831 0.716 0.565 0.800
OLS estimates of equation (3.1) for 1985 & 2014. The dependent variable is the occupational
employment share, and income levels are included as the base 2 logarithm of PPP-adjusted per-
worker GDP, relative to U.S. levels in 2000. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10 percent
(∗), 5 percent (∗∗), and 1 percent (∗∗∗).
Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
Figure 3.1 plots the estimated development profiles and employment shares for two
years: 1985 and 2014. Each subpanel presents the information for an occupational
group. The horizontal axes contain income levels, and the vertical axes occupational
employment shares. Each circle represents a country, and its size is proportional to its
level of employment. The information in black represents observations in 1985, and
information in gold represents observations in 2014. It bears reminding that income
is expressed relative to the U.S. level in 2000: during 1985, this income was 70 percent
for the U.S., and 111 during 2014. This is to capture how occupational employment
shares change during the different stages of development.
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Figure 3.1: Occupational Development Profiles: 1985 & 2014
(a) Abstract occupations
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(b) Routine Occupations
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(c) Manual Occupations
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Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
88
This figure shows that there is a strong link between a country’s income level,
and its occupational employment shares. Typically, a country with a low income
level also has a low share of its employment in abstract occupations. Countries with
higher incomes, also have higher employment shares in abstract occupations. This is
the case during 1985 and 2014. Routine occupations show the same pattern; countries
with low levels of income have low employment shares, and tend to increase them as
they develop. Finally, manual occupations show the opposite pattern. Low levels of
income are associated with very high shares in manual occupations.
These development profiles capture the link between the distribution of employ-
ment across occupations and income levels at a point in time. For a given year, the
movements along these curves tell us how the occupational employment shares are
expected to change as countries develop. Take, for example, a country like Morocco.
In 1985 its income level is 1/16 of the U.S. level in 2000, and its employment share in
manual occupations was 68 percent. According to the development profile in 1985, if
it were to develop and reach an income level of 1/8, we would expect it to decrease
its employment share in manual occupations to 50. That’s the expected employment
share in manual occupations for a country with that level of income, like Chile. There-
fore comparing countries with different levels of income at a point in time involves
assessing movements along the occupational development profiles.
Despite this simple characterization, these profiles capture most of the variability
in occupational employment shares. In 1985, for instance, the R-squared of these three
regressions is 0.8 on average, as shown in table 3.1. In 2014, this average decreases
to 0.7, mostly driven by the increased dispersion in routine occupational shares.
This analysis, so far, has focused on the employment changes for a given devel-
opment profile. The next section analyzes the changes of these profiles change over
time.
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World Polarization
Job polarization, in developed economies, translates to decreases in employment
shares for routine occupations. In the sample I use, between 1990 and 2014 the
routine employment share for this group of economies (weighted by employment lev-
els) decreased by 0.45 percentage points, annually. Abstract occupations increased
its employment share by 0.41, while manual occupations increased it by 0.04.6 This
is consistent with the evidence in Autor et al. (2003), Autor and Dorn (2013), and
Goos et al. (2014). World polarization, on the other hand, translates to decreases
in the development profile for routine occupations, and increases in the development
profiles of abstract and manual occupations.
This section focuses on the movements of the occupational development profiles,
rather than individual changes in employment shares. Typically, countries with lower
income levels have higher manual employment shares, and countries with higher in-
come levels have higher abstract employment shares. The movements along the devel-
opment profiles suggest different changes in their employment shares as they develop.
The countries I analyze are more heterogeneous, and are in different stages of de-
velopment. Therefore, analyzing the changes in the entire profile provides a way to
analyze employment trends, globally.
A second look at Figure 3.1 shows how the world has polarized. For that, we
need to compare the development profiles of 1985 (depicted by the black lines) to
the profiles of 2014 (depicted by the golden lines). Analogously to the concept of job
polarization, world polarization implies that the development profile of routine occu-
pations decreased, while the development profiles of abstract and manual occupations
6The list of developed economies is: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain,
and United States.
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increased.
Between 1985 and 2014, the largest change happened in the routine development
profile. On average, every decade saw this development profile decrease by 3 percent-
age points. In 1985, a country with an income of 1/4 of the U.S. 2000 level, like Spain,
had in expectation a routine employment share of 38 percent. In 2014, a country with
the same income level, like Peru, had in expectation a routine employment share of
27.
This is a novel finding, which contrasts with the analyses in the structural trans-
formation literature. Cross country evidence of employment changes at the industry
level suggests that currently, a country with an income level of the U.S. in 1980 has a
similar industrial composition to what the U.S. had in 1980.7 Industries and occupa-
tions are closely related, but the connection between development and occupational
employment levels changed over time.
Moreover, examining the relationship between polarization and structural trans-
formation more closely reveals that polarization is happening mostly due to changes
within industries, rather than between industries. Intuitively, the routine employ-
ment share in a country can decrease because it is moving towards industries that
do not require routine workers (structural transformation, or changes between in-
dustries), or because all industries are requiring less routine workers (polarization
within industries). A shift-share decomposition quantifies the contribution of these
two movements. During these years, two thirds of the employment changes happened
within industries. This means that polarization is happening in addition to structural
transformation, not due to it. Further details of this shift-share analysis are presented
in Appendix C.2.
Notice that a lower routine development profile does not mean that all countries
7See Herrendorf et al. (2014a) for a discussion.
91
will have lower routine employment shares. It means that for a given level of de-
velopment, routine employment shares will be lower, but as countries develop, they
may have higher routine employment shares. The key distinction are the movements
along the development profile, and the movements of the development profile. Take,
for example, Costa Rica’s development process. Between 1985 and 2014, its routine
employment share barely increased: it went from 29.16 to 29.46 percent.8 Its income
level, however, did change: in 1985 it was 15 percent of the U.S. level in 2000, and
by 2014 it had increased to 31. The development profile of 1985 predicted its rou-
tine employment share to increase by 7 percentage points. This corresponds to the
movements along the development profile. In 2014, however, the development profiles
had changed, and for Costa Rica’s income level, it predicted a much lower routine
employment share. This corresponds to the movements of the development profile.
In practice, these two resulted in a slightly higher routine employment share.
Lastly, notice that the change in the routine development profile is different for
countries with low and high income levels. It is not a parallel shift of the profile,
and the counterparts of these movements are also different. For countries with lower
income levels, this decrease is mostly made up for by a higher manual development
profile, and for countries with higher income levels, in abstract. In figure 3.1, the
change in the abstract development profile looks more like an increase in its slope,
while the change in the manual development profile looks more like an increase in its
intercept. This asymmetry implies that, as countries with low income levels develop,
manual occupation shares will decrease, but more slowly than the development profile
suggests.
To summarize the empirical findings, in this section I introduce the concept of the
8During this period, most of the labor reallocation happened between abstract and manual oc-
cupations, exchanging about 6 percentage points.
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occupational development profiles. Its goal is to link the distribution of occupational
employment shares to income levels. These development profiles have shifted over
time, resulting in world polarization: a lower development profile for routine occu-
pations, and higher profiles for manual and abstract occupations. This is, modern
growth has been biased against routine occupations. The following section quantifies
task-specific productivity levels that are compatible with these facts, and what their
changes imply for the following years.
3.3 Further Polarization Is on Its Way
The way an economy allocates its resources is informative of its productive tech-
nology. In this section, I apply this idea to the occupational distributions through
a development accounting exercise. This allows to quantify the task-specific produc-
tivities behind occupational distributions, and document the biases in technological
progress. This section is structured as follows. The first part introduces the polariza-
tion accounting framework, and the way to map it to the data. The second explains
its results; how technical change has been biased taking as a benchmark the 1985
development profiles. The third part explains the VAR framework I use to forecast
technological trends, and the fourth section analyzes these forecasts until 2050.
3.3.1 Polarization Accounting
The goal of this section is to provide a way to quantify two aspects of modern
economic growth: the technological factors behind occupational employment shares,
and their change over time. This is, I perform a polarization accounting exercise,
similar to the development accounting discussed in Hsieh and Klenow (2010). Devel-
opment accounting “uses cross-country data on output and inputs, at one point in
time, to assess the contribution of differences in factor quantities and the efficiency
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with which these factors are used” (Caselli, 2005, p. 681). Polarization accounting
uses data on occupational employment shares to quantify these efficiency levels.
For that purpose, consider an economy following the task-based approach to pro-
duction, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). To produce output, firms need to combine
tasks according to a production function. In that sense, tasks are the basic building
blocks in production. To map this framework to the data discussed in the previous
section, I assume there are three tasks: abstract (a), routine (r), and manual (m).
For notation purposes, task-specific variables are denoted by the j subindex, so that
j ∈ {a, r,m}.
The production of task j depends on two components: an amount labor, lc,j,t,
and a task-specific productivity level Ac,j,t. Their product results in efficiency units
of labor. The subindex c represents the country, and t the time. Technology is
labor-augmenting, and these task-specific productivity levels effectively capture all of
the factors increasing these efficiency units. This is a reduced-form way of grouping
factors like equipment and machines that are specific to the production of tasks, and
capital stocks and total factor productivity that are not.9
Final output requires these three tasks. Production happens according to the
following constant elasticity of substitution production function:
yc,t =
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ω
1
ε
j (Ac,j,tlc,j,t)
ε−1
ε
 εε−1 (3.2)
where ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among tasks, and ωj > 0 is the production
intensity of task j. These task intensities add up to one.10 In this framework, task-
9An alternative, but equivalent approach would look at the costs of producing tasks, rather than
its efficiency levels like Goos et al. (2014).
10These intensities are raised to the power 1/ε so that the limit case where ε→ 0 converges to a
Leontief utility function: lim
ε→0
= min
j∈{a,r,m}
{ωjAc,j,tlc,j,t}.
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specific productivity levels and the distribution of labor are country-specific; the
elasticity of substitution and the task intensities are not.
Labor can be allocated to the production of any of these tasks. For simplicity
(and data limitations), labor is homogeneous and has no task specificity to it. Since
the main interest is on the technological changes leading to polarization, I assume
that labor is perfectly mobile across tasks.11 I normalize the total labor force to 1, so
that these labor inputs represent occupational employment shares. This means that
yc,t effectively corresponds to output per worker. This is also the measure I match in
the data. Then,
1 =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
lc,j,t (3.3)
I model the allocation of labor through competitive markets. Firms are price and
wage takers, and there is free entry into the production of the final good. Their
production technology is represented the production function (C.12), so that their
optimization problem is:
max
{lc,j,t}j∈{a,r,m}
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ω
1
ε
j (Ac,j,tlc,j,t)
ε−1
ε
 εε−1 − ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
wc,j,tlc,j,t (3.4)
In this setting, the final good is the numeraire, and firms hiring labor face wages
wc,j,t. Free entry in this context implies wage equalization, since labor is homogeneous
and mobility is costless. In addition, profits are zero due to constant returns to scale
11This is a common assumption in the structural transformation literature. See, for example,
Baumol (1967), Kongsamut et al. (2001a), Ngai and Pissarides (2007b), and Duarte and Restuccia
(2010). Their focus, as in this paper, is on the technological aspects of employment movements, so
this assumption is mostly made out of convenience. Other papers, like Caselli and Coleman (2001a)
and Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018) consider labor heterogeneity. In a separate project, we analyze the
costs of reallocation.
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in production. The optimal allocation of labor depends on the production intensities,
productivity levels, and elasticity of substitution as follows:
lc,j,t
lc,k,t
=
ωj
ωk
(
Ac,k,t
Ac,j,t
)1−ε
(3.5)
With this optimality condition and the normalization of the labor force, we can
aggregate the production function. Final output can be expressed exclusively as
function of the productivities in each of these tasks:
yc,t =
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ωj
A1−εc,j,t
 1ε−1 (3.6)
These last two expressions are key to matching the model with the data. For
country c, we observe its income level yc,t, and its distribution of employment by
occupations, {lc,j,t}j∈{a,r,m}. The objective of this framework is to infer the task-
specific productivities, Ac,j,t. Combining equations (3.5) and (3.6) allows to do so by
setting a system of 3 equations in 3 unknowns:
Ac,j,t = yc,t
 ∑
k∈{a,r,m}
ωj
lc,k,t
lc,j,t
 11−ε (3.7)
I set the elasticity of substitution ε to 0.35, as in Vindas (2017), which analyzes
occupational U.S. data. In addition, I normalize income levels and task-specific pro-
ductivities to U.S. levels in 2000, which provides a way to estimate the task-intensity
parameters ωj. Therefore, both income and task-specific productivities are expressed
in relative terms to U.S. levels in 2000, maintaining consistency with the units of
measurement of the empirical section.12
The last part of this article forecasts task-specific productivity growth as a way to
forecast the development profiles. For that, we need an expression for the occupational
12This normalization plays no important role in the following analyses since it scales productivities
by the same factor.
96
employment shares as a function of the task-specific productivities. This results from
combining equations (3.3) and (3.5):
lc,j,t =
ωj/A
1−ε
c,j,t∑
k∈{a,r,m} ωk/A
1−ε
c,k,t
(3.8)
3.3.2 Accounting Results
Countries develop and change their occupational employment shares according to
their task-specific productivities. This section documents the productivity changes
inferred from the polarization accounting exercise. The first part documents the
historical changes by showing their growth rates. The second compares them to
growth patterns implied by the development profiles of 1985.
Historical Growth
Table 3.2 shows the averages and the standard deviations of the productivity growth
rates between 1985 and 2014. Each country-year pair is counted independently, so
that countries with longer histories have a larger weight. It also presents these sum-
mary statistics, but weighted by their employment levels.
Between 1980 and 2014, productivity growth rates were the lowest in abstract
occupations, independently of whether these are weighted by employment or not. This
is a clear reflection of Baumol’s cost disease, but applied to occupations (Baumol et al.,
1985). Routine and manual occupations have very similar productivity growth rates.
Productivity in routine tasks is slightly higher at the country level, but weighting by
employment reverts this.
These changes in task-specific productivities relate to occupational employment
shares through equation (3.5):
lc,j,t
lc,k,t
=
ωj
ωk
(
Ac,k,t
Ac,j,t
)1−ε
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Table 3.2: World Task-Specific Productivity Growth Rates (%): 1980-2014
Unweighted Employment-weighted
N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Abstract 2186 1.027 7.732 1.885 5.287
Routine 2186 4.029 6.741 3.917 4.765
Manual 2186 3.840 6.901 3.933 4.573
Task-specific productivity growth rates estimated from equation (3.7), not av-
erage log-differences. Unweighted statistics consider each country-change pair
equally; employment-weighted consider the country’s employment levels
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT data.
Over time,employment shares will depend on the relative task-specific productivities,
and their elasticity of substitution. In the production function, the magnitude of
ε determines how employment shares respond to changes in relative productivities.
When ε > 1, tasks in production are good substitutes: if Ac,j,t increases, its employ-
ment share will do so as well. When ε = 1, the production function converges to a
Cobb-Douglas, and employment shares do not depend on the productivities. When
ε < 1, as I assume here, tasks are complements, and the production function resem-
bles more a Leontief technology. When Ac,j,t increases, this will actually decrease the
employment share in occupation j.
These summary statistics are a good starting point to analyze how productivities
changed over time. The nonlinearities in the production function mean that these
effects will be different, depending on the productivity levels of the other tasks. The
following section, then, analyzes productivity growth patterns taking into account the
development profiles.
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Measuring Productivity Biases
The development profiles summarize the link between levels of income and occupa-
tional employment shares in a given year. From equation (3.1):
dj,t(y) = β0,j,t + β1,j,ty + β2,j,ty
2
Therefore, these profiles summarize the expected path of occupational employment
shares as countries develop. These also have a counterpart for the path of task-specific
productivities. From equation (3.7), denote these expected productivity paths by Aj:
Aj(y; t) = y
 ∑
k∈{a,r,m}
ωj
dk,t(y)
dj,t(y)
 11−ε
Mechanically speaking, for all levels of income y, the development profiles dj,t(y)
predict a distribution of employment shares, which altogether imply a level of task-
specific productivity. The last section documented how these development profiles
have shifted over time. Then, the changes in these paths of productivities provide a
natural benchmark to evaluate whether technological growth has been biased.
Define the productivity bias in task j with respect to period t as the log-difference
in a measured task-specific productivity level, Aj, with respect to the productivity
level that the development profile of period t predicts for its income level, Aj(y; t).
Denote this productivity bias by bj(y, Aj; t). Then,
bj(y, Aj; t) = log(Aj)− log
(Aj(y; t)) (3.9)
In this definition, productivity is biased against occupations j if bj(y, Aj; t) > 0. This
is, if task-specific productivity is higher than the development profile in period t pre-
dicted for the income level y. The bias is against occupation j because a higher
task-specific productivity level implies a lower employment share. Conversely, pro-
ductivity is biased in favor of occupation j if bj(y, Aj; t) < 0 by the same reasoning.
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Figure 3.2: Productivity Biases in 2014 with respect to 1985
(a) Abstract occupations
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(b) Routine Occupations
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(c) Manual Occupations
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Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
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Figure 3.2 shows the productivity biases in 2014 with respect to 1985. The hor-
izontal axes show income levels, and the vertical axes the biases measured through
(3.9). As before, each circle represents a country, and its size is proportional to its
employment level.
Between 1985 and 2014, technical change has consistently been biased against
routine occupations, and in favor of manual occupations. The bias in abstract occu-
pations, shown in the first panel, follows no consistent pattern: for some countries
it has been positive, and for some it has been negative. There does not seem to be
any systematic relationship with respect to income levels, either. For routine occupa-
tions, the result is markedly different: productivity growth has been biased against
these occupations because it has consistently been positive. Only in three countries
the bias has been negative. Manual occupations show the opposite pattern: their
productivity growth patterns result in negative biases, producing higher manual em-
ployment shares than the development profile of 1985 suggests. Furthermore, this
bias shows a negative relationship with income, so that countries with higher levels
of income have shown larger biases in favor of manual occupations. Then, techni-
cal change has consistently been biased against routine occupations, and in favor of
manual occupations.
3.3.3 VAR Analysis
The previous sections focused on a historical analysis of task-specific productiv-
ities, by quantifying its growth patterns and biases. The following sections provide
a forward-looking exercise by extrapolating these productivity trends, and analyzing
the implications for employment distributions in the future.
A forecast of the world distribution of occupations could be based on the lat-
est development profile, and predict employment changes along these profiles. This
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wouldn’t be a satisfactory approach: the productivity biases between 1985 and 2014
suggest that movements of the development profiles are important in describing how
the world distribution of occupations has changed. This means that an exercise
in forecasting should focus on the evolution of the productivities, and their contin-
ued departure from the established development profiles. In this section, I analyze
task-specific productivity growth through a VAR model. This is a flexible enough
framework allowing for different growth rates across countries and task-specific pro-
ductivities, as well as interaction terms.
The type of analysis that I use here has commonly been applied in studies of
cross-country convergence of per capita GDP levels, like Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992) and Caselli et al. (1996). This line of thought considers a negative relationship
between initial income levels and their subsequent growth path. My analysis differs
in two dimensions. First, instead of considering one level of income, I study a three-
dimensional vector of productivities. These productivities relate to income levels
through equation (3.6). Second, the productivities I study are expressed as gaps from
a technological frontier. This follows the idea of technological diffusion in Parente and
Prescott (1994).
In this particular setting, I use the U.S. productivities AUS,j,t as the technological
frontiers. I forecast future task-specific productivity levels in two steps. In the first,
I extrapolate historical trends for the U.S. productivity levels. In the second, I use
a VAR model to predict the path of the gaps for each country relative to the U.S.
These gaps are defined as:
A˜c,j,t =
Ac,j,t
AUS,j,t
(3.10)
The growth process of the U.S. productivities follows a simple path of constant
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Table 3.3: U.S. Productivity Log-Differences: 1980-2014
Occupational Productivity Log-Difference
Abstract Routine Manual
Constant
0.0011 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
OLS estimates of equation (3.11). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at 10 percent (∗), 5 percent (∗∗), and 1 percent (∗∗∗).
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT
data.
growth rates. The model I estimate is:
∆ log(AUS,j,t) = αUS,j + US,j,t (3.11)
Which is a trio of random walks with drifts. Table 3.3 shows the results of regressing
the difference of the U.S. log-productivity levels with only a constant term.
The average difference in the log-productivity of routine tasks is the highest at
0.049 log points per year, followed by manual at 0.024. These two are statistically
significant. Productivity changes in abstract occupations are much lower at 0.001
log points per year. This is not statistically different from zero; its standard error
is quantitatively similar to the other two, but its level is too low. These are the
differences I use to forecast the technological frontier up to 2050. Between 2014 and
2050, productivity in abstract tasks will grow by a factor of 1.03, while in routine and
manual the growth factor is 3.38 and 1.80, respectively.
The second step involves a VAR forecast of the productivity gaps with respect to
the U.S. levels. Because I study the three productivities jointly, I group them into a
103
vector of log-gaps: a˜c,t = [log A˜a,c,t, log A˜r,c,t, log A˜m,c,t]
′. The model I estimate is:
∆a˜c,t = αc + Ba˜c,t−1 + ec,t (3.12)
The dependent variables are the differences in the productivity log-gaps, ∆a˜c,t. Coun-
tries can vary in terms of their institutions and resources, which can result in different
long-run productivity gaps. I capture these differences through country fixed effects,
grouped in the vector αc = [αa,c, αr,c, αm,c]. The 3 × 3 matrix B contains the coeffi-
cients associated with the lagged log-gaps, and ec,t = [εa,c,t, εr,c,t, εm,c,t] is the vector
of error terms that are centered around zero, and are identically and independently
distributed.
Two properties of this system are of interest: the long-run expected productivity
log-gaps, and the dynamic path towards it. The long-run expected productivity log-
gaps are the equivalent to a steady-state gap. These follow from equation (3.12), and
require the expected differences in log-productivities to be zero. Therefore:
a˜c,t = a˜c,t−1 = a¯c (3.13)
a¯c is the vector of long-run expected productivity log-gaps. This is equal to:
a¯c = −B−1αc (3.14)
Notice these gaps have a common component through B, but also depend on the
country-specific fixed effects.
We now turn to the dynamic path towards these long-run log-gaps. For that,
it is useful to rewrite equation (3.12) as deviations from the long-run productivity
log-gaps. In expectation:
(a˜c,t − a¯c) = (I+B)(a˜c,t−1 − a¯c) (3.15)
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Then, the deviations from the long-run productivity log-gaps are fully determined by
I+B. In particular, this implies that the forecast k periods in advance is:
(a˜c,t+k − a¯c) = (I+B)k(a˜c,t − a¯c) (3.16)
This is the expression that I use to forecast the productivity log-gaps. Whether this
system is convergent, and its speed of convergence depends on the eigenvalues of
I+B.
Table 3.4 presents three components of the estimated VAR system. First, the
estimates of the B matrix, second the eigenvalues of the matrix I+B, which dictate
the dynamics over time, and lastly, the rates of convergence to the long-run expected
productivity log-gaps.
Most of the estimates in B are statistically significant. The columns contain the
estimates for each of the dependent variables, the differences of the log-productivity
gaps. The rows group the effects of the independent variables, the lagged productivity
log-gaps. The diagonal terms in abstract and routine productivities are negative, as
expected. Heuristically, if we ignore the non-diagonal terms, countries with higher
deviations from their long-run productivity log-gaps in abstract and routine tasks
close these deviations faster. This is not the case for manual productivity, since its
difference is associated with a positive, but not statistically significant, estimate of its
lagged log-gap. This means that, log-gaps in manual productivity are mostly driven
by log-gaps in routine productivity since it’s the only coefficient that is statistically
significant.
The dynamics of a growth regression are simple to interpret if the dependent
variable is unidimensional. The model can be rearranged as a difference equation,
and the coefficient associated to the first lag determines the speed of convergence to
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Table 3.4: VAR Estimate Results
Productivity Log-difference of productivity gap in
log-gap in Abstract Routine Manual
Abstract
-0.087∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.001
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Routine
-0.034∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Manual
0.051∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Eigenvalues associated to the dynamic system
0.915 0.955+0.019i 0.955-0.019i
Annual convergence rates (moduli)
0.085 0.045
Upper section contains the VAR estimate of matrix B in (3.12).
Middle section contains the eigenvalues of matrix I+B, and
lower section contains their moduli. Asterisks indicate statisti-
cal significance at 10 percent (∗), 5 percent (∗∗), and 1 percent
(∗∗∗).
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT
data.
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its steady state.13 A three-dimensional vector requires a slightly different approach.
The system (3.15) has to be diagonalized to get an autonomous system of difference
equations. This simplifies greatly the analysis of its dynamic properties, and the steps
to do so are explained in appendix C.3. This analysis boils down to two sets of values:
the eigenvalues of the system, and their moduli. These are presented in the bottom
part of table 3.4.
The system, altogether, is convergent with small cycles. The cyclical behavior
follows from the eigenvalues, and the convergence from the moduli of these eigenval-
ues. Complex eigenvalues, like the ones from this system, indicate cyclical behavior.
Convergence to the long-run log-gaps is not monotone, but the cyclical components
(i.e., the coefficients associated to the imaginary part) are fairly small. The moduli
of these eigenvalues are less than one, which mean that the system is convergent
to the long-run productivity log-gaps in (3.14). Notice that these convergence rates
correspond to the diagonalized system, which is a linear combination of the three
productivity log-gaps. These converge at a rate between 4.5 and 8.5 percent per year.
The non-diagonalized convergence rates, the ones at the log-gap level, are discussed
in the following section. These are lower, and closer to the estimates of Sala-i-Martin
(1994).
3.3.4 Forecasting Results
The previous section analyzed the growth patterns of task-specific productivities
through a VAR model. In this one, I use the estimated model to extrapolate them.
This exercise forecasts historical trends for 36 years, and the main goal is to describe
the occupational development profiles in 2050. The forecasts begin in 2015, since
current income data in the Penn World Tables is published up to 2014.
13See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for several applications of this analysis.
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Table 3.5: U.S. Task-Specific Log-Productivity & Occupational Employment Shares
(1980, 2014 & 2050)
Year
Log-Productivity Employment Shares
Abstract Routine Manual Abstract Routine Manual
1980 15.305 14.509 14.662 29.42 45.94 24.64
2014 15.341 16.167 15.465 42.66 32.06 25.29
2050 15.379 17.926 16.316 56.90 19.71 23.39
Historical data for 1980 & 2014; 2050 forecasts from model (3.11).
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT data.
Even though the main goal is to describe employment shares, this exercise fore-
casts task-specific productivities. Employment shares, as described in equation (3.8)
are non-linear functions of the countries’ task-specific productivities. Because of that,
I focus on predicting these productivities as a way to construct occupational employ-
ment shares. This, as explained previously, involves two steps. In the first one, I
forecast task-specific productivity growth in the U.S., which is the technological fron-
tier in this framework. The second one forecasts the gaps with respect to that frontier.
Ultimately, I combine these two forecasts to get employment shares, and describe the
occupational development profiles.
Technological Frontier Forecast
The results of the productivity extrapolation in the U.S. are in Table 3.5. It contains
the task-specific log-productivities and their implied employment shares in 1980, 2014,
and 2050. Naturally, we can compare two periods. The first contains historical U.S.
data from 1980 to 2014, and the second contains the forecasted data from 2014 to
2050.
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Figure 3.3: U.S. Occupational Employment Shares: 1980 - 2050
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Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
By construction, log-productivities in the forecasted years change at the same
rate as the historical data. The occupational employment shares, by contrast, change
differently. The employment share in routine occupations continues to decrease, but
its change slows down. During the historical period it decreased by 0.41 percentage
points, annually, and in the forecasted it decreases by 0.34. The employment share
in manual occupations goes from minor increases to minor decreases. During the
historical period it increased by 0.02 percentage points annually, and decreases by 0.05
in the forecasted data. The increases in the employment share in abstract occupations
slightly accelerate from 0.39 percentage points, to 0.40 in the forecasted data. These
differences are due to the non-linearities that determine the employment shares, even
though the underlying productivities grow at constant rates. These shares are also
plotted in figure 3.3. By the end of the forecasted period, routine occupations will
have the lowest employment share. Manual occupations will decrease during these
years, but routine occupations will decrease at a much faster pace.
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Productivity Gaps Forecast
The second step forecasts the differences in log-productivity gaps with the VAR
model. As discussed in the previous section, the dynamics imply a convergent path
towards long-run productivity log-gaps, which are specific to each country in the sam-
ple. Table 3.6 shows the results of this forecast. To summarize the information at the
world level, it reports averages across countries. First, it contains the productivity
log-gaps with respect to the technological frontier in 2014 and 2050. These follow
from the definition in equation (3.10): a˜c,t = [log A˜a,c,t, log A˜r,c,t, log A˜m,c,t]
′. It also
shows the log-deviation from the long run productivity gaps: a˜c,t − a¯c. The last
column shows the average change over this period, which is the same for the log-gaps
and the log-deviations. Log-gaps show how far countries are from the technological
frontier; log-deviations show how far countries are from their long-run productivity
gaps.
The larger log-gaps are in the productivity of manual tasks, followed by routine
and abstract tasks. These log-gaps close over time, and maintain the same order
by the end of the forecasted period. This is true as well for the log-deviations from
the long-run gaps. Notice, however, that these log-deviations are not negligible by
the end of the forecasted period. For abstract occupations, a log-deviation of -0.142
translates to a ratio of its productivity gap with respect to its long-run productivity
gap of 0.9.14 This is, by 2050, the average productivity gap in abstract tasks will be
at 90 percent of its long-run value. For routine and manual tasks, these values will be
81.3 and 80.7 percent. This means that the deviations from the long-run productivity
gaps will still remain an important determinant of the employment distributions. The
last column shows the average change during the forecasted period, which is the same
14These are base 2 logarithms, so that elevating 2 to the power a˜ results in the ratio of the
productivity levels.
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Table 3.6: World Productivity Gaps: 2014 & 2050
Occupation
Log-gaps Log-deviations Average
2014 2050 2014 2050 change
Abstract -0.503 -0.013 -0.637 -0.142 0.014
Routine -1.231 -0.519 -1.016 -0.299 0.020
Manual -3.007 -1.961 -1.363 -0.309 0.029
Log-gaps as defined in equation (3.10), and log-deviations as in (3.15).
Averages correspond to the simple mean across countries; average change
is the same for log-gaps and log-deviations.
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT data.
for the log-gaps and the log-deviations. Overall, convergence to the long-run log-gaps
is fastest in manual occupations, followed by routine and abstract.
Employment Shares Forecast
The forecast of the productivity log-gaps and the productivity frontier provides enough
information to forecast the employment distributions up to 2050. For that, I use equa-
tion (3.8):
lc,j,t =
ωj/A
1−ε
c,j,t∑
k∈{a,r,m} ωk/A
1−ε
c,k,t
Table 3.7 shows yearly average changes in occupational employment shares for
two periods: the historical period between 1980 and 2014, and the forecasted period
between 2014 and 2050. To summarize the changes in the world distribution of
occupations, it shows two averages: one that weights equally each observation, and
another one that weights them according to the countries’ employment levels in 2014.
The occupational changes observed during the historical period will continue until
2050. Abstract occupations will continue to increase, while routine and manual will
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Table 3.7: World Annual Occupational Employment Share Changes: 1980-2014 &
2014-2050
Occupation
Country average (unweighted) World average (weighted)
1980-2014 2014-2050 1980-2014 2014-2050
Abstract 0.346 0.397 0.195 0.294
Routine -0.193 -0.243 -0.082 -0.211
Manual -0.154 -0.154 -0.113 -0.083
Changes expressed as percentage points per year. Country averages weight each country-
year change equally; weighted averages use employment in 2014.
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT data.
continue to decrease. Whether we look at the simple averages, or the employment-
weighted ones, the results are very similar. Worldwide, the employment-weighted
share in abstract occupations will increase, and will accelerate over time. The his-
torical data shows that it increased by 0.195 percentage points every year, and the
forecasted shares increase by 0.294 percentage points per year. The worldwide de-
crease in routine occupations will accelerate quite dramatically. From decreasing
0.082 percentage points annually, the forecast establishes that it will decrease 0.211
in the following years. Finally, the drop in manual occupations will slow down. His-
torically, it fell by 0.113 percentage points annually, but the forecasts suggest it will
drop by 0.083 annually. These changes may seem small at face value, but represent
enormous amounts of workers reallocating. Over the course of the forecasted period,
226 million workers will reallocate to abstract occupations, 162 millions will move out
of routine occupations, and 64 millions will move out of manual occupations.
Graphically, these changes are plotted in figure 3.4. It shows the occupational
employment shares, weighted by the countries’ employment levels, between 1985 and
112
Figure 3.4: World Occupational Employment Shares: 1985 - 2050
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Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
2050.15 At the world level, abstract occupations increase and manual occupations
decrease monotonically, but routine occupations show a “hump-shape”. This is rem-
iniscent of the analyses of structural transformation (employment shares by industry,
rather than occupation), like Ngai and Pissarides (2007b), Buera and Kaboski (2009),
and Duarte and Restuccia (2010). Differently to these, this plot aggregates the em-
ployment shares at the world level, instead of the country level data. Qualitatively,
it shares the rise and fall of one of the categories, in this case routine occupations.
The world employment share in abstract occupations will increase from 20 percent
in 2014 to 31 in 2050. Routine occupations will decrease from 23 percent to 15, and
manual occupations will decrease slightly from 57 to 54 percent.
The last paragraphs described the predicted changes at the world level, aggregat-
ing over countries. These countries, however, will still differ in their levels of income
and employment distributions. Precisely due to these differences, this paper analyzed
15This plot begins in 1985 since between 1980 and 1984, employment for the countries in the
sample reached less than 65% of the level of the full sample.
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the occupational development profiles, rather than world totals. Figure 3.5, then,
shows the predicted development profile of 2050, in addition to the development pro-
files of 1985 and 2014. As before, the observations in black represent data from 1985,
and the observations in gold represent data from 2014. The forecasted data for 2050
is presented in maroon.
The main result is that world polarization will continue. Between 1985 and 2014,
this meant a lower development profile for routine occupations, and higher develop-
ment profiles for abstract and manual occupations. Between 2014 and 2050, this will
be the case as well: the development profile in abstract occupations will be slightly
higher, in routine occupations it will be much lower, and in manual occupations it
will be higher. Most of the changes will happen among these last two occupations.
Perhaps surprisingly, the development profile of abstract occupations changes lit-
tle, compared to the change between 1985 and 2014. The shape of the profile in 2050,
in the first panel, shows only a slight increase. This is a reflection of the biases doc-
umented in figure 3.2. In abstract tasks, productivity growth showed no systematic
bias. Because of that, the development profile changed little.
The development profile in routine occupations, in the second panel, keeps de-
creasing. It also shows a larger drop than between 1985 and 2014. This means that
in the following years, productivity growth in routine tasks will be high enough to
make many routine workers redundant. It’s also worthy to note how the “hump-
shape” flattens over time. During the forecasted period, countries will catch up to
the technological frontier, that is making routine tasks very productive. This causes
technological progress in the rest of the countries biased against routine occupations,
resulting in a flatter profile.
For manual occupations, in the third panel, changes happen in the opposite direc-
tion. The development profile shifts upwards, which means that for a given level of
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Figure 3.5: Occupational Development Profiles: 1985, 2014 & 2050
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(b) Routine Occupations
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(c) Manual Occupations
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Source: author’s calculations using ILOSTAT, IPUMS & PWT.
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income, a country will have on average a higher employment share in 2050 compared
to both 1985 and 2014. The reasoning behind this change in the development pro-
file, is the same as for routine occupations. The productivity growth bias, however,
happens in the opposite direction.
These results are driven completely by the growth patterns of task-specific produc-
tivities. These, as explained before, are built in two steps: one forecasts the evolution
of the technological frontier, and the other one forecasts the gaps with respect to that
frontier. Which one is driving most of the employment shifts? Over time, we can
decompose overall productivity changes into these two components:
∆ac,t = ∆aUS,t + ∆a˜c,t (3.17)
This tells us how much of the changes in productivity is due to the frontier growing,
and how much by the gaps closing. Table 3.8 shows this decomposition. The first
column shows the average annual change in the task-specific productivities, ∆ac, and
breaks it down into the contribution of the technological frontier, ∆aU.S., and the
change in countries’ gaps, ∆a˜c.
The contribution of these two factors, overall, is sizable. This decomposition,
however, throws very different results across tasks. For abstract tasks, most of the
growth is due to the gaps closing, while in routine tasks, the technological frontier
growth outpaces the contribution of the gaps closing. For manual tasks, the growth
in the productivity still plays a predominant role. This means that the obsolescence
of routine workers is mostly a product of the productivity changes happening at the
technological frontier. Productivity growth is so high that its effect will eventually be
transmitted to the rest of the countries, and push routine employment shares down,
as in this forecast exercise.
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Table 3.8: World Productivity Growth Sources
Average log-productivity Average contribution (%)
change (annual) Frontier Gaps
Abstract 0.013 17.2 82.8
Routine 0.067 74.2 25.8
Manual 0.050 55.2 44.8
Results of decomposition (3.17). Averages correspond to unweighted means
across countries.
Source: author’s calculations using IPUMS, ILOSTAT & PWT data.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper, I present new stylized facts about the distribution of occupations
in the world. I expand significantly the countries in the analysis to a sample of 119
countries covering all levels of economic development. The result of this analysis is
that job polarization is a global phenomenon.
At any point in time, there is a strong link between a country’s development
level and its occupational employment shares. This is what I call the occupational
development profile. Over time, this profile has shifted, resulting in world polarization.
The development profile for routine occupations has decreased, coupled with higher
manual and abstract development profiles. The modern growth experience, then, is
biased against routine occupations.
To analyze these development patterns, I follow the grouping principle for occu-
pations and develop a polarization accounting framework at the task level. Technical
change has been biased against routine occupations and biased in favor of manual
occupations.
These technological trends imply that as countries continue to develop, we can
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expect lower employment shares in routine occupations, and higher in manual occu-
pations, worldwide. Through a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis, I forecast the
path of productivity growth, and conclude that world polarization will continue. In
the following years, then, the development profile for routine occupations will keep
decreasing, and the profile for manual occupations will keep increasing.
In this paper, I present a first analysis of the task-specific productivities behind
world polarization. Future research plans include the expansion of this model to
endogenize technical progress through an task-investment-specific growth model. The
details of such a framework are presented in Appendix C.4, and its implementation
is left as future work.
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A.1 Data Sources
The data I use covers the 1968-2018 period, and comes from the employment data
in the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement to the Current Population
Survey. I accessed these databases from the IPUMS-CPS project, an integrated
set of data from the Current Population Surveys that goes through a convenient
harmonization process. I consider the population aged between 25 and 65 years, and
use their labels to determine industry, occupation (for the employed), and labor force
status.
I construct the industry categories by grouping into goods and services. The goods
industry includes both the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which encompass
manufacturing, construction, mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishery industrial clas-
sifications. The industrial classifications of the services industry are transportation,
communications, public utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance, real
estate, business and repair services, personal services, entertainment and recreation
services, professional and related services, and public administration.
To construct the occupation categories, I follow Corte´s et al. (2014). They classify
occupations based on two criteria: whether the tasks they involve are primarily man-
ual or cognitive, and whether these are of a routine nature or not. Jaimovich and Siu
(2012) note that there is a ranking in terms of wages: non-routine cognitive earn the
highest while non-routine manual the lowest. In terms of tasks, non-routine cognitive
tend to be high-skilled, while non-routine manual tend to be low-skilled. Routine
manual and routine cognitive tend to be middle-skilled, so I group them together,
in a similar fashion to Corte´s (2016). I end up with three occupation groups then:
non-routine manual, routine, and non-routine cognitive. Due to their association with
the skills required, in the rest of the article I refer to these as manual, routine, and
abstract occupations.
With every decennial Census, the occupation classifications are revised. These
imply discrete jumps in their structure; even with the coarse grouping I use the
changes are visible. The biggest changes were made with the 1983 and 2003 Censuses,
which explain some of the shifts in the figures presented later. Both the harmonization
processes from the IPUMS project and the analyses in Corte´s et al. (2014) are careful
enough to try and minimize these effects. In terms of the longer time trends, these
reclassifications do not alter overall patters, and do not represent a significant concern.
A.2 Detailed Tables
Table A.1: Occupational Job Polarization
1968 2018
Manual 11.2 14.2
Routine 59.3 42.9
Abstract 29.5 42.9
These percentages refer to each occupation’s share in em-
ployment.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
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Table A.2: Job Polarization and Non-employment
1968 2018
Manual 7.6 11.1
Routine 40.0 33.7
Abstract 19.9 33.6
Non-employment 32.6 21.6
These percentages refer to each category’s share in the total
population.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
Table A.3: Occupation Shares within Industries
Goods Services
1968 2018 1968 2018
Manual 1.2 1.3 18.1 17.6
Routine 76.7 68.5 47.4 36.2
Abstract 22.1 30.2 34.5 46.2
These percentages refer to the share of each occupation the
industry’s labor demand.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
Table A.4: Industry Shares
1968 2018
Goods 40.6 20.9
Services 59.4 79.1
These percentages refer to the share of each industry in the
labor force.
Source: author’s calculations using CPS.
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A.3 Model
In this section, I present a static model of labor allocation between occupations
to study the patterns shown earlier. It is a variation of Duernecker and Herrendorf
(2016) and Ngai and Petrongolo (2014): a model of structural transformation, that
features occupational choices within the firms, and allows for labor non-participation
by including a home production sector.
The agents in this model choose between market and non-market work. In the
market, firms decide how to allocate their labor into the three market occupations:
manual, routine or abstract. In non-market work, agents devote time exclusively to
home production. The driving force is occupation specific technical progress, and the
difference in their growth rates induces the three main results: polarization, structural
transformation, and changes in the labor force participation.
A.3.1 Environment
This is a discrete-time model where time runs forever. On the production side, I
follow Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) and study three productive sectors: goods, market
services, and home services. To distinguish between the jobs agents are working in,
and the industries where these take place, I denote by lowercase j the occupation,
and by uppercase I the industry. Then, j ∈ {h,m, r, a}, meaning these jobs can be
in home production, manual occupations, routine occupations, and abstract occupa-
tions. Similarly, I ∈ {G,M,H} denotes the production of goods, of market services,
and of home services.
Home services are produced with a linear technology on home labor:
YHt = AhtNHht (A.1)
where Aht denotes the efficiency of home production, and NHht denotes the amount
of labor used in home production.
The firms in goods and market services produce with a technology that requires
the three types of market occupations: manual, routine, and abstract. These are
combined according to a CES aggregator:
YIt =
 ∑
j∈{m,r,a}
α
1
σ
Ij(AjtNIjt)
σ−1
σ
 σσ−1 (A.2)
where I ∈ {G,M} indicates the industry and j ∈ {m, r, a} the occupation. In this
setting, NIjt denotes the input that industry I uses of occupation j, and Ajt is the
labor efficiency in occupation j. The elasticity of substitution between the labor
inputs is σ > 0, and αIj ∈ (0, 1) is the intensity of occupation j in sector I. This
productive structure is similar to Duernecker and Herrendorf (2016), where labor
efficiency is occupation-specific as opposed to industry specific, which is the standard
assumption in the structural transformation literature.
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For notational convenience, define the following:
NIt = NImt +NIrt +NIat I ∈ {G,M} (A.3)
Njt = NGjt +NMjt j ∈ {m, r, a} (A.4)
Nt = Nmt +Nrt +Nat
= NGt +NMt (A.5)
where NIt is the total amount of labor in industry I ∈ {G,M}, Njt is the total
amount of labor in occupation j ∈ {m, r, a}, and Nt is total market labor, which is
clearly equal to the sum of labor over market industries or occupations.
On the consumption side, there are identical households of measure one. These
consume goods and a combination of home and market services. The utility level
they yield is aggregated according to a nested CES specification:
Ut(CGt, CSt) =
[
ω
1
ε
G(CGt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
S (CSt)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
(A.6)
where CGt and CSt denote the consumption of goods and compound services. Their
relative weights are ωG and ωS, which add up to one, and individually are between
zero and one. The elasticity of substitution between goods and compound services is
ε > 0.
Compound services are also aggregated through a CES specification:
CSt =
[
ϕ
1
η
M(CMt)
η−1
η + ϕ
1
η
H(CHt)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(A.7)
where CMt and CHt denote market and home services. Their relative weights are ϕM
and ϕH , which also add up to one, and individually are between zero and one. The
elasticity of substitution between market and home services is η > 0.
All households are endowed with one unit of labor in each period. I denote by Lt
total labor supply, and the remaining 1− Lt is devoted to home production. Within
the market, labor is perfectly mobile across occupations, and has no occupation or
sector specificity to it.
The feasibility conditions for the consumption sectors are:
YGt = CGt (A.8)
YMt = CMt (A.9)
YHt = CHt (A.10)
These equations simply require that what is produced in the goods, market services
and home services industries be consumed by the households.
Finally, the feasibility condition for the labor market requires that the households’
labor supply be equal to the market demand:
Lt = Nmt +Nrt +Nat
= NGt +NMt
= Nt (A.11)
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A.3.2 Decentralized Market Structure
I assume competitive markets for labor, goods and market services, where all
agents take the prices as given. Firms in the consumption and market services indus-
tries face the following profit-maximization problem:
max
NImt,NIrt,NIat
pIt
 ∑
j∈{m,r,a}
α
1
σ
Ij(AjtNIjt)
σ−1
σ
 σσ−1 (A.12)
− wt(NImt +NIrt +NIat)
where pIt is the market price of their output, and wjt the market wages. First order
conditions imply:
NImt
NIrt
=
αIm
αIr
(
Art
Amt
)1−σ
(A.13)
NIat
NImt
=
αIa
αIm
(
Amt
Aat
)1−σ
(A.14)
Equations (A.13) and (A.14) describe the relative labor allocations between manual
and routine occupations, and abstract and manual occupations, each for industry
I ∈ {G,M}.
Taking prices as given, the household’s utility-maximization problem at time t is:
max
Lt,CGt,CMt
[
ω
1
ε
G(CGt)
ε−1
ε + ω
1
ε
S (CSt)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
(A.15)
subject to:
pGtCGt + pMtCMt = wtLt
CSt =
[
ϕ
1
η
M(CMt)
η−1
η + ϕ
1
η
H(CHt)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
CHt = Aht(1− Lt)
Households then, maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint in market
products, and their technology constraint in household production. This problem can
be solved in two steps: the first is to find the optimal allocation between home and
market services, and the second one is for the optimal allocation between goods and
compound services.
Home services are not traded in the market, meaning there is no market price
attached to them. Its opportunity cost, however, is well defined since its alternatives
have market prices attached to them. I denote by pHt this implicit price. The first
order conditions to maximize CSt imply:
pMtCMt
pHtCHt
=
ϕM
ϕH
(
pMt
pHt
)1−η
(A.16)
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Define the following price index:
pSt =
[
ϕH(pHt)
1−η + ϕM(pMt)1−η
] 1
1−η (A.17)
This price index can be interpreted as the unit price of the optimal services basket,
which is relevant for the decision between the consumption of goods and the composite
services basket. For this decision, first order conditions imply:
pStCSt
pGtCGt
=
ωS
ωG
(
pSt
pGt
)1−ε
(A.18)
A.4 Estimation Procedure
In this section, I explain in further detail how to match the data to the model’s
parameters. Recall the assumption of constant growth rates in productivity; because
of that I only need to look at the initial and final years. These are denoted by t = 0
and t = T .
To get the market occupation intensities in production (αIj), I use equations
(A.13) (A.14). For the initial year, these imply:
αIr = αIm
NIr0
NIm0
αIa = αIm
NIa0
NIm0
(A.19)
These two yield the intensities, since all three add up to one.
To get the relative weights in the consumption of market and home services (ϕH
and ϕM), and in the consumption of goods and services (ωG and ωS), I use equations
(1.13) and (1.15) in a similar fashion:
ϕH = ϕM
NH0
NM0
ωG = ωSϕM
NG0
NM0
(A.20)
To get the elasticity of substitution in the production function, I first rewrite the
average labor productivity (1.10):
A˜It = Art
{
αIr
[
1 +
αIm
αIr
(
Art
Amt
)1−σ
+
αIa
αIr
(
Art
Aat
)1−σ]} −11−σ
= Art
{
αIr
[
1 +
NImt
NIrt
+
NIat
NIrt
]} −1
1−σ
(A.21)
Then, I use equation (1.15) in the final period, substituting in equations (1.13) and
(A.21):
NMT
NGT
=
ωS
ωG
αMr
αGr
(
1 + NMmT
NMrT
+ NMaT
NMrT
)
(
1 + NGmT
NGrT
+ NGaT
NGrT
)

1−ε
1−σ (
ϕM
NST
NMT
) 1−ε
1−η
(A.22)
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Applying logarithms and rearranging leads to my estimate of σ.
To get relative occupational productivities, I use the occupation shares in period
T , and equations (A.13) and (A.14) for the market services industry. Rearranging,
these give:
AmT
ArT
=
(
αMm
αMr
NMrT
NMmT
) 1
1−σ AaT
ArT
=
(
αMa
αMr
NMrT
NMaT
) 1
1−σ
(A.23)
To get the productivity levels in market occupations, I use data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. In particular, I take the real gross domestic product per capita
time series (A939RX0Q048SBEA) to establish that this has grown by a factor of
2.23 between 1968 and 2018. To reproduce this growth pattern, I match this factor
with market production evaluated at year 0’s prices. Substituting (A.21) into the
production function (A.2):
2.23 =
pM0YMT + pG0YGT
pM0YM0 + pG0YG0
=
ArT
Ar0
NMT
[
αMr
(
1 + NMmT
NMrT
+ NMaT
NMrT
)] −1
1−σ
+NGT
[
αGr
(
1 + NGmT
NGrT
+ NGaT
NGrT
)] −1
1−σ
NM0
[
αMr
(
1 + NMm0
NMr0
+ NMa0
NMr0
)] −1
1−σ
+NG0
[
αGr
(
1 + NGm0
NGr0
+ NGa0
NGr0
)] −1
1−σ
(A.24)
This yields the growth factor of productivity in routine occupations. With this I
reconstruct the other productivity levels for market occupations.
Finally, from equation (1.13) in the final year, I get the productivity level in home
production:
ArT
AhT
=
[
ϕM
ϕH
NHT
NMT
] 1
1−η
[
αMr
(
1 +
NMmT
NMrT
+
NMaT
NMrT
)] 1
1−σ
(A.25)
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B.1 United States Data
For the United States we draw on census microdata, taken from Ruggles et al.
(2010). We exclude the 1850 and 1860 censuses because they did not enumerate slaves.
The 1890 census microdata were lost in a fire. We pool the 2008–2012 American
Community Surveys to take the place of a 2010 census, in line with usual IPUMS
practice. The pooled surveys have very similar questions, responses, and coverage
as the 2000 census. Together, we have 14 surveys spanning 140 years at ten year
intervals, excluding 1890.
We focus throughout on workers who are employed and have a valid response
to age and industry of employment. We aggregate industry codes to three broad
industry groups. Agriculture includes farming, forestry, and fishing. Manufactur-
ing includes most remaining goods production, including manufacturing, mining, and
construction. Services includes the remaining industries: utilities; retail and wholesale
trade; hotels and restaurants; finance, insurance, and real estate; public administra-
tion and defense; education; health and social services; private household services;
and other/miscellaneous services. We discard reported industry of employment for
those younger than 20, under the view that this likely represents part-time or seasonal
work and not a serious career choice.
Our demographic analysis focuses on the role of education, gender, and marital
status in accounting for structural transformation. We focus here on the years 1940–
2010, since education is available in the United States only from 1940 onward. We
focus on workers with valid responses to all three questions. We aggregate the detailed
variables so that we have broader categories that are easily comparable over time. We
have two gender categories (male and female); two marriage categories (married and
unmarried, which includes separated, divorced, and widowed); and four education
categories (less than primary complete, primary complete, secondary complete, and
tertiary complete).
B.2 International Data
Our international sample includes all countries for which we have been able to
acquire repeated (at least two) nationally representative cross-sections of microdata
that include employment status and industry of employment. We further limit our
attention data that include sufficient detail that we can harmonize these key objects
in a reasonably consistent way; we also eliminate a few countries or samples that
cover shorter periods (generally, less than eight years) to avoid confusing temporary
changes with trends.
Most of our data come from IPUMS. Minnesota Population Center (2014) includes
repeated cross-sections for 54 countries with the necessary information. Ruggles et al.
(2010) provides the censuses for Puerto Rico. Minnesota Population Center (2017)
includes additional cross-sections for Canada as well as new data for Norway from
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.1 Finally, we have identified three countries
1Specific data provided by Inwood and Chelsea (2011), Gaffield et al. (2009), The Digital Archive
(The National Archive), Norwegian Historical Data Centre (University of Tromsø) and the Minnesota
Population Center (2008a), The Norwegian Historical Data Centre (University of Tromsø) and the
Minnesota Population Center (2008), The Digital Archive (The National Archive), Norwegian His-
136
Figure B.1: Countries in Dataset
Years Covered:
No Data
8-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
120-140
with independent data of sufficient information that we were able to harmonize and
add to this dataset. All told, our dataset for studying worker reallocation includes
201 samples from 59 countries. Figure B.1 shows the countries covered and the total
length spanned by country. Our coverage is broad both in terms of geography and
PPP GDP per capita. Table B.1 includes a full list of countries and years.
The IPUMS team has devoted a great deal of energy to harmonizing variables
and responses across countries and years. The most important for our purposes is
that they have re-coded each country’s original responses for the industry or sector
question (e.g., the one describing the activity or product produced at the respondent’s
workplace) into a variable they call indgen, which is a slightly modified version of
the ISIC 1-digit industry coding scheme. As they note, this coding process is non-
trivial, in three main ways. First, for some countries the underlying codes are too
coarse to be mapped into indgen at all; these countries are absent from our data.
Second, in some countries not all of the original industry codes can be mapped into
the indgen classification scheme. Finally, there are inevitably some judgment calls
when constructing such crosswalks. The main examples described by the IPUMS
team involve categories which are small (repair work) or judgment calls that are not
relevant for our work (distinguishing among the service industries when mapping an
industry). We aggregate these categories into the three broad industry groups as
explained in the last subsection.
B.3 Alternative Industry Decompositions
In the text we focus on the classic three-industry description of structural trans-
formation. This industry decomposition is useful for middle income countries, but
less so for poor or rich countries, where agriculture or services respectively dominate.
Here we show that our results are robust to studying alternative decompositions.
When studying poor countries, it is common to group all of non-agriculture to-
gether and focus simply on the transition from agriculture to non-agriculture. We
torical Data Centre (University of Tromsø) and the Minnesota Population Center (2008b), and The
Digital Archive (The National Archive), Norwegian Historical Data Centre (University of Tromsø)
and the Minnesota Population Center (2011).
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Table B.1: Structural Transformation Sample
Country N Years Country N Years
Argentina 4 1970–2001 Austria 5 1971–2011
Bangladesh 3 1991–2011 Bolivia 3 1976–2001
Botswana 4 1981–2011 Brazil 5 1970–2010
Cambodia 2 1998–2008 Canada 7 1891–2011
Chile 5 1960–2002 China 3 1982–2000
Colombia 4 1964–2005 Costa Rica 5 1963–2011
Dom. Republic 5 1960–2010 Ecuador 5 1962–2010
Egypt 2 1996–2006 El Salvador 2 1992–2007
Fiji 5 1966–2007 France 5 1962–2011
Germany (West) 2 1971–1981 Ghana 3 1984–2010
Greece 5 1971–2011 Haiti 2 1982–2003
Hungary 2 2001–2011 India 3 1983–2009
Indonesia 4 1971–2010 Ireland 4 1971–2011
Jamaica 3 1982–2001 Kyrgyzstan 2 1999–2009
Liberia 2 1974–2008 Malawi 3 1987–2008
Malaysia 2 1991–2000 Mali 3 1987–2009
Mexico 5 1960–2015 Morocco 3 1982–2004
Mozambique 2 1997–2007 Nicaragua 3 1971–2005
Norway 4 1865–1910 Palestine* 2 2000–2015
Panama 6 1960–2010 Paraguay 5 1962–2002
Peru 2 1993–2007 Philippines 2 1990–2000
Poland 2 1978–2002 Portugal 4 1981–2011
Puerto Rico 5 1970–2015 Romania 4 1977–2011
South Africa 2 1996–2007 South Korea* 4 1986–2016
Spain 3 1981–2001 Switzerland 4 1970–2000
Tanzania 2 2002–2012 Thailand 4 1970–2000
Trinidad & Tobago 3 1980–2000 Turkey 2 1985–2000
United Kingdom* 3 1997–2014 United States 14 1870–2015
Uruguay 2 1996–2006 Venezuela 3 1981–2001
Vietnam 3 1989–2009 Zambia 3 1990–2010
* Samples derived from independently collected labor force surveys. The remaining
samples are from Ruggles et al. (2010), Minnesota Population Center (2014), and
Minnesota Population Center (2017).
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Table B.2: Between Cohort Share for Alternative Industry Groupings
Number of Broad Industries Between Share
Two 71%
Four 49%
Fifteen 53%
showed in Table 2.1 that the between share is highest for agriculture. Thus, not sur-
prisingly, this leads to a higher role for the between share in structural transformation,
reported in the first row of Table B.2.
For rich countries it might be useful to decompose services, given that it now
accounts for a large majority of employment (Duarte and Restuccia, 2017). We
follow Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018) by breaking services into unskilled and
skilled categories based on average education of the workforce. The former includes
primarily personal services, wholesale and retail trade, and hotels and restaurants;
the latter includes professional services. Figure B.2 shows graphically how structural
transformation looks. Unskilled services display a mixed, possibly inverse-U shape
similar to manufacturing, while skilled services grow uniformly. The second row of
Table B.2 shows that this extra detail matters little for our basic metric; the between
share in this case is 49 percent. To push this point even further, we can use a
fifteen sector decomposition (the full detail of indgen as coded in ipums). With this
decomposition the between share is still 53 percent. This suggests that the finding
of an important role for new cohorts in accounting for structural transformation is
robust.
B.4 Solution to Career Choices
The solution to the dynamic discrete choices that make up the career decisions
of workers in this model involves several conditional probabilities and conditional
expectations of transformations of independently exponentially distributed random
variables. In this section we derive these conditional probabilities and expectations in
closed form. Because of the length of these derivations and the resulting expressions,
they are omitted from the main text.
The variables we derive in closed form in this section are
• Φt (i), the probability of a worker of age h = 0 being trained to work in sector
i at time t.
• z˜t (i; 0), the average productivity level of a worker trained to work in sector i at
time t.
• Γt (i, j;h), the probability that a worker of age h > 0 who works in sector i at
time t− 1 decides to get retrained and starts working in sector j at time t.
• z˜t (i, j;h), the average productivity level of a worker of age h > 0 who decided
to work in sector j at time t while having worked in sector i in period t− 1.
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Figure B.2: Structural Transformation in the United States: 4 Industry View
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All four of these variables can be derived using two results on the distribution
and expectation of the maximum of three linear transformations of exponentially
distributed random variables. We derive these results in general first below and then
show how they apply to the four variables at hand.
Two main results about exponentially distributed random variables
The two results we consider are about linear transformations of three indepen-
dently Exponentially distributed random variables, Zi ∼ Exp (1) where i = 1, . . . , 3.
We write these transformations as Xi = aiZi + bi, where ai, bi > 0.
The first result we use is that for the probability that Xi is the maximum of the
sample of three X’s, which we denote by pii. In terms of order statistics, this is
pii = P
[
Xi = X(3)
]
= P
[
aiZi + bi = max
j=1,...,3
{ajZj + bj}
]
. (B.1)
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Using the notation that j 6= i and k 6= j and k 6= i, we can write this probability as
pii =
∫ ∞
¯
zi
(
1− exp
(
−aiZ + bi − bj
aj
))(
1− exp
(
−aiZ + bi − bk
ak
))
exp (−Z) dZ,(B.2)
where
¯
zi = max
j=1,...,3
{bj − bi
ai
}. (B.3)
The above integral can be written in terms of four subintegrals. This yields
pii =
∫ ∞
¯
zi
exp (−Z) dZ (B.4)
− exp
(
bj − bi
aj
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
aj
}
Z
)
dZ (B.5)
− exp
(
bk − bi
ak
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
}
Z
)
dZ (B.6)
+ exp
(
bj − bi
aj
+
bk − bi
ak
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
+
ai
aj
}
Z
)
dZ (B.7)
= exp (−
¯
zi) (B.8)
− exp
(
bj − bi
aj
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1aj
}
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
aj
}
¯
zi
)
(B.9)
− exp
(
bk − bi
ak
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1ak
}
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
}
¯
zi
)
(B.10)
+ exp
(
bj − bi
aj
+
bk − bi
ak
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1aj +
1
ak
}
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
+
ai
aj
}
¯
zi
)
.(B.11)
For the numerical implementation, it is important to also take into account the
limiting behavior of this integral when the a’s go to zero. If aj ↓ 0 then (B.5) and
(B.7) are zero, and the integral only consists of (B.4) and (B.6). Similarly, if aj ↓ 0
then (B.6) and (B.7) are zero, and the integral only consists of (B.4) and (B.5).
Finally, if ai ↓ 0 then pii is not an integral, but instead equals
pii =
{(
1− exp
(
− bi−bj
aj
))(
1− exp
(
− bi−bk
ak
))
if bi > bj and bi > bk
0 otherwise
. (B.12)
In this expression, the first term goes to one when aj ↓ 0 and the second term goes
to one when ak ↓ 0.
We summarize this definition by definining the function
pii = Π (ai, bi, aj, bj, ak, bk) , (B.13)
which is what we will use later on to define two of the four variables of interest.
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The second main result that we consider is about the expected value of Zi con-
ditional on Xi being the third order statistic. We denote this expectation by ζ˜i and,
formally, it is defined as
ζi = E
[
Zi
∣∣Xi = X(3) ] = E [Zi ∣∣∣∣aiZi + bi = maxj=1,...,3{ajZj + bj}
]
. (B.14)
Given this definition, we can write
ζi =
1
pii
∫ ∞
¯
zi
Z
(
1− exp
(
−aiZ + bi − bj
aj
))(
1− exp
(
−aiZ + bi − bk
ak
))
exp (−Z) dZ.
(B.15)
This, again, can be written in terms of four subintegrals as
ζi =
1
pii
∫ ∞
¯
zi
Z exp (−Z) dZ (B.16)
− 1
pii
exp
(
bj − bi
aj
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
Z exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
aj
}
Z
)
dZ (B.17)
− 1
pii
exp
(
bk − bi
ak
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
Z exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
}
Z
)
dZ (B.18)
+
1
pii
exp
(
bj − bi
aj
+
bk − bi
ak
)∫ ∞
¯
zi
Z exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
+
ai
aj
}
Z
)
dZ. (B.19)
Each of these subintegrals can be solved by using the result that∫
x exp (−bx) dx = − 1
b2
(bx+ 1) exp (−bx) . (B.20)
Doing so, we obtain that
ζi =
1
pii
(1 +
¯
zi) exp (−
¯
zi) (B.21)
− 1
pii
exp
(
bj − bi
aj
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1aj
}2({
1 +
ai
aj
}
¯
zi + 1
)
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
aj
}
¯
zi
)
(B.22)
− 1
pii
exp
(
bk − bi
ak
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1ak
}2({
1 +
ai
ak
}
¯
zi + 1
)
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
}
¯
zi
)
(B.23)
+
1
pii
exp
(
bj − bi
aj
+
bk − bi
ak
){ 1
ai
1
ai
+ 1aj +
1
ak
}2
× (B.24)({
1 +
ai
aj
+
ai
ak
}
¯
zi + 1
)
exp
(
−
{
1 +
ai
ak
+
ai
aj
}
¯
zi
)
.
Again, it is useful to consider the limiting cases. When aj ↓ 0 then (B.17) and
(B.19) go to zero and the integral just consists of parts (B.16) and (B.18). When
ak ↓ 0 then (B.18) and (B.19) go to zero and the integral consists of (B.16) and
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(B.17). When ai ↓ 0 then the value of Zi does not matter for the career choice. As a
result, in that case ζi = E [Zi] = 1.
We summarize this definition by definining the function
ζi = Z (ai, bi, aj, bj, ak, bk) , (B.25)
which is what we will use later on to define two of the four variables of interest.
Career-choice probabilities and expected productivity levels
To shorten the notation, it turns out to be useful to define
V˜t+1 (i, h) =
1− δ
1 + r
EtVt+1 (i, h+ 1; zt+1) . (B.26)
Using the above definition and the results derived in the subsection above, we can
now write
Φt (i) = Π
(
(1− φ)wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− φ)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , (1− φ)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
,
(B.27)
as well as
z˜t (i; 0) = Z
(
(1− φ)wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− φ)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , (1− φ)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
.
(B.28)
Moreover, we can write
Γt (i, i;h) = Π
(
wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− γh)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , (1− γh)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
, (B.29)
and
Γt (i, j;h) = Π
(
(1− γh)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− γh)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
, (B.30)
when j 6= i.
The associated expected productivity levels are
z˜t (i, i;h) = Z
(
wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− γh)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , (1− γh)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
, (B.31)
and
z˜t (i, j;h) = Z
(
(1− γh)wj,t, V˜t+1 (j, h) , wi,t, V˜t+1 (i, h) , (1− γh)wk,t, V˜t+1 (k, h)
)
, (B.32)
when j 6= i.
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B.5 Calibration of Flexible Benchmark Parameters
For the dynamics of employment shares in the model, what matters is the product
of the preference parameter, λi, and the technology parameter, Ai. For this reason,
we normalize the preference parameters2 to be equal across industries
λa = λm = λs =
1
3
. (B.33)
Moreover, because preferences are homothetic and the production technology ex-
hibits constant returns to scale, the absolute levels of the technology parameters (Ai)
do not matter for the equilibrium dynamics, but their relative levels. With that in
mind, we also normalize
Aa = 1. (B.34)
These two normalizations leave six parameters to be pinned down based on his-
torical U.S. data, namely Am, As, ga, gm, gs, and ε. We choose them such that the
flexible benchmark model matches the following historical facts for the U.S. economy:
• Employment shares in 1870 and 2010: The percent of workers employed in
agriculture, manufacturing, and services, at both the beginning, i.e. 1870, and
end, i.e. 2010, of the historical sample that we consider. These shares are taken
from the Decennial U.S. Censuses digitized and made available by Minnesota
Population Center (2017). Because employment shares add up to one, this
provides four moment conditions, two in 1870 and two in 2010, to match.
• Average real GDP per capita growth: The average annualized growth rate of real
GDP per capita from 1870 through 2010, from Bolt and van Zanden (2014).
This is the fifth moment we match.
• Estimates of elasticity of substitution: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution,
ε, based on postwar U.S. national income data reported in Ngai and Pissarides
(2008a). This is the final moment condition.
In practice, this means that we follow a procedure similar to the one used by
Ngai and Pissarides (2008a). First, just like Ngai and Pissarides (2008a), we choose
ε = 0.1 which is consistent with postwar U.S. NIPA data. We then find the values
for Am and As under which the employment shares in the flexible benchmark match
the 1870 employment shares in the data. Next, we find the relative growth rates of
manufacturing and services, i.e. gm − ga and gs − ga, to match the 2010 employment
shares. Finally, we choose ga such that the flexible benchmark matches the average
growth rate of real GDP per capita from 1870 through 2010. The values of the non-
normalized parameters that we obtain using this method, are ga = 0.045, gm = 0.020,
and gs = 0.013 for the annualized TFP growth rates, and Am = 2.970, and As = 1.638
for the initial relative productivity levels of manufacturing and services.
2This normalization affects the value added shares in GDP, which we do not focus on. It does
not affect any of the dynamics that we analyze in this paper.
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Figure B.1: Path of employment shares in flexible benchmark and data
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Source: Minnesota Population Center (2017) and authors’ calculations
In terms of unmatched moments in the data, the implied growth rate of agriculture
that results from this calibration is about a percentage point higher than the actual
growth rate from merged data from Kendrick (1961) and postwar Industry Accounts
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. When ε > 0.1 the implied growth rate of
agriculture is even higher.
Figure B.1 plots the implied time-series paths of the employment shares in the
model and the data. These shares are equal in 1870 and 2010 by construction.
B.6 Details about Flexible Benchmark
The flexible benchmark in which (re-)training costs are zero, i.e. φ = γh = 0
for h = 1, . . . , H is our point of comparison for many of our results. Therefore, we
describe the equilibrium path under the flexible benchmark here in more detail. In
particular, we focus on the results plotted in Figure B.1. The flexible benchmark
equilibrium in this economy is similar to that in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018) and we
touch on many of the same qualitative properties here that Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018)
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discuss in much more detail.
Because the outputs of the three sectors are gross complements, the relative wage
of workers in the services sector is increasing over time. This is because these workers
are getting hired to provide the services that complement that manufacturing and
agricultural output for which relatively little labor is need to produce. The trends in
wages is depicted in Panel (a) of Row (i) of Figure 2.4 in the main text.
The increasing wage gap draws more and more workers into the service sector over
time, as can be seen from Figure B.1a. In the intermediate stages of the transition
the employment share of manufacturing peaks while that of agriculture monotonically
declines.
Even though a larger fraction of workers is drawn into services over time, this
does not translate into higher output growth in services because of the lower TFP
growth rate in services, gs, than in manufacturing, gm and agriculture, ga. Moreover,
as Ngai and Pissarides (2007a) emphasize, the CES preferences with ε < 1 imply that
the relative price, as well as its value-added share in GDP, of the good that grows
most slowly will rise over time. As a result, the slowest growing sector makes up an
increasing part of GDP over time and drags down overall GDP growth. This can be
seen from Figure B.1b where aggregate GDP increasingly aligns with services output
over the transition path. In this sense, our model economy suffers from the Cost
Disease described in Baumol and Bowen (1968).
But it is not only the exogenously lower rate of TFP growth, gs, that drags down
output growth in the service sector. Average labor productivity growth in this model
is determined by both the exogenous rate of TFP growth as well as the selection of
workers into different sectors. Just like in Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2018) the average quality
of workers in the service sector declines over time. This is because the increasing wedge
in real wages between services and the other sectors draws workers of lower quality,
z˜s, into services over time. This can be seen from Figure B.1c, which plots the index
of z˜i for i ∈ {a, s,m}, as well as the average for the whole economy (aggregate). At
the end of the quarter millenium transition that we consider this selection of workers
across sectors increases labor productivity in agriculture by a factor of two, while
reducing that in services by about 40 percent. Because the service sector becomes
the predominant sector over time, this decline in labor quality in services drags down
aggregate labor quality and, with it, growth in average labor productivity.
This selection effect of workers across sectors in small, however, when compared
to the productivity growth rates experienced by each of the sectors. This can be seen
by comparing the scale of the vertical axis in Figure B.1c with that of Figure B.1d.
The latter plots the log-indices of average labor productivity for the three sectors in
the economy as well as aggregate labor productivity. Notice how the Cost Disease of
Baumol and Bowen (1968) results in a perpetual productivity slowdown.
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Figure B.1: Dynamics of flexible benchmark
(a) Employment
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(b) Sectoral output levels
Log-index, normalized at 0 at t = 0.
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(c) Labor quality
Log-index of labor quality by sector, 0 at t = 0
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(d) ALP
Log-index of output per worker, normalized at 0 at t = 0
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Note: Years are plotted on the horizontal axis. t = 0 is the equivalent of the beginning of our
data sample, i.e. 1870, and t = 140 is the equivalent of 2010.
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B.7 Implementation of Extended-path Method
For our solution method, we consider the transitional path from t = 0 − t˜l until
t = T + t˜r. Here t˜l and t˜r are padding of the extended path that allow for startup and
wind-down periods on the path. We present results for t = 0, . . . , T . For t > T + t˜r
we assume the economy is on a balanced growth path in which gi = g > 0 for
i ∈ {a,m, s}. Moreover, we assume that, after t > T+ t˜r workers do not need to spend
time on training and retraining anymore. Hence, our solution method isolates the
importance of these costs along the transitional path where structural transformation
occurs.3
At each point in time, t, the relevant state of the economy consists of three parts.
The first are the sector-specific TFP levels, {Ai,t}i∈{a,m,s}. The second is the size of
the new cohort, Nt (0). The final part is the labor supply, that consists of different
age-industry-specific levels {{Et−1 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}.
The TFP levels and initial cohorts evolve exogenously over time, according to
Ai,t = (1 + gi)Ai,t−1, where Ai,0 is given and i ∈ {a,m, s}, (B.35)
and
Nt (0) = (1 + n)Nt−1 (0) . (B.36)
Our solution method is used to solve for the endogenous evolution of {{Et (i;h)}Hh=0}i∈{a,m,s}
in equilibrium along the transitional path for t = −t˜l + 1 . . . T + t˜r. Note that
the initial age-industry-specific levels of the labor supply, at time t = 0, are given.
Thus, we solve the transitional dynamics of the model conditional on the initial state
{{E0 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}. Our method loops over a backward and a forward recursion
until reaching convergence.
Backward recursion: Update career choices conditional on labor supply
This recursion starts at time t = T + t˜r and runs backwards to t = −t˜l. It takes
the path of the age-industry levels of the labor supply, {{Et (i;h)}Hh=0}i∈{a,m,s} for
t = −t˜l + 1 . . . T + t˜r, as given.
Labor market equilibrium at time t: The main step in this backward recursion
is to solve for the equilibrium in the three labor markets at time t, taking as given
the age-industry specific levels of the labor supply, {{Et−1 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}, as well
as the age-industry specific career continuation values, {{EtVt+1 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}.
This requires solving for real wages, {wi,t}i∈{a,m,s}, using a system of 3 equations.
Taking as given the continuation values, {{EtVt+1 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}, a given set
of three wages {wi,t}i∈{a,m,s} pins down the optimal career decisions that determine
Φt (i), φ˜t (i), Γt (i, j;h), and γ˜t (i, j;h) through the solution described in Section B.4.
With this, we can find the equilibrium wages {wi,t}i∈{a,m,s} that clear the labor mar-
kets, (2.21).
We evaluate Φt (i), φ˜t (i), Γt (i, j;h), and γ˜t (i, j;h) at these equilibrium wages
and the continuation values {{EtVt+1 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}. Then, we iterate backwards.
3We have checked the robustness of our results for the choice of T and g as well as the length of
padding t˜l and t˜r.
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Because of the idiosyncratic nature of the (re-)training costs, we can write
Et−1Vt (0) =
∑
i∈{a,m,s}
Φt (i)
(
(1− φ) z˜t (i)wi,t + 1− δ
1 + r
EtVt+1 (i; 1)
)
. (B.37)
and for h = 1, . . . , H − 1
Et−1Vt (i;h) =
∑
j∈{a,m,s}
Γt (i, j;h)
[
(1− I (i 6= j) γ) z˜t (i, j;h)wi,t + 1− δ
1 + r
EtVt+1 (j;h+ 1)
]
.
(B.38)
Finally, we have
Et−1Vt (i;H) =
∑
j∈{a,m,s}
Γt (i, j;H) (1− I (i 6= j) γ) z˜t (i, j;H)wj,t. (B.39)
These equations now allow us to solve the relevant continuation values using a back-
ward recursion. Of course, this solution is conditional on {{Et (i;h)}Hh=0}i∈{a,m,s}.
With these continuation values for t− 1 in hand we can now solve the labor market
equilibrium for period t− 1 conditional on {{Et−1 (i;h)}Hh=0}i∈{a,m,s} using the same
method and role this backward recursion all the way from t = T + t˜r to t = −t˜l.
Forward recursion: Update labor supply conditional on career choices
In the forward recursion we now update the path of the age-industry specific
levels of the labor supply, {{Et (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}, using the career choices solved
in the backward recursion. This simply involves iterating over the law of motion
of the labor supply from (2.17) and (2.18). This recursion is initialized using the
initial condition that gives the age-industry specific labor supply levels at time t = 0,
i.e. {{E0 (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s}. We continue to loop over the backward and forward
recursions until the calculated path of the age-industry specific labor supply levels,
{{Et (i;h)}Hh=1}i∈{a,m,s} for t = −t˜l + 1 . . . T + t˜r, converges.
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C.1 Data Sources
The data I use comes from three sources: the ILOSTAT database from the Inter-
national Labor Organization, the Penn World Tables, and the census databases from
the IPUMS-International Project. The macroeconomic variables, such as employ-
ment and GDP, come from the PWT. The data for the distribution of employment
shares across occupations is a combination of ILOSTAT and consolidated data from
IPUMS-International. Both IPUMS and ILOSTAT have occupational information at
the ISCO-08 1-digit level, which I combine as follows. Abstract occupations consist
of Managers, Professionals, and Technicians and Associate Professionals (groups 1, 2,
and 3). Routine occupations consist of Clerical Support Workers, Craft and Related
Trades Workers, ans Plant and Machine Operators, and Assemblers (groups 4, 7, and
8). Manual occupations consist of Services and Sales Workers, Skilled Agricultural,
Forestry, and Fishery Workers, and Elementary Occupations (groups 5, 6, and 9).
When data from IPUMS and ILOSTAT overlay, the data from IPUMS takes priority,
and the rest of the series is built with the changes in the employment shares.
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Table C.1: Country Data Availability
Country Years Country Years
Argentina 2004–2014 Armenia 2011–2014
Aruba 1994–2011 Australia 1991–2014
Austria 1981–2014 Azerbaijan 2003–2014
Bahamas 1991–2009 Bahrain 1991–2004
Barbados 1994–2014 Belarus 1999–2009
Belgium 1993–2014 Belize 1993–1999
Bermuda 2000–2007 Bhutan 2006–2014
Bolivia 1992–2014 Botswana 1991–2011
Brazil 1980–2014 Bulgaria 2000–2014
Burkina Faso 1985–1996 Cambodia 1998–2008
Canada 1981–2011 Cayman Islands 1991–2008
Chile 1982–2014 China 1982–1990
Hong Kong SAR 1994–2014 Costa Rica 1984–2014
Croatia 1996–2014 Cyprus 1999–2014
Czech Republic 1993–2014 Denmark 1992–2014
Dominica 1991–2001 Dominican Republic 1981–2014
Ecuador 1982–2014 Egypt 1986–2014
El Salvador 2008–2012 Estonia 1990–2014
Fiji 1986–2007 Finland 1997–2014
France 1982–2014 Georgia 1998–2007
Germany 1992–2014 Ghana 1984–2010
Greece 1981–2014 Guatemala 2012–2014
Guinea 1983–1996 Haiti 1982–2003
Hungary 1990–2014 Iceland 1991–2014
India 1983–2012 Indonesia 1980–1995
Iran 1996–2014 Ireland 1981–2014
Israel 1995–2014 Italy 1992–2014
Jamaica 1982–2008 Japan 2009–2014
Kazakhstan 2001–2013 Kyrgyzstan 2003–2014
Latvia 1996–2014 Lebanon 2004–2007
Lithuania 1997–2014 Luxembourg 1992–2014
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Table C.2: Country Data Availability (Ctn’d)
Country Years Country Years
Malawi 1987–2008 Malaysia 1980–2014
Mali 1987–2014 Malta 2000–2014
Mauritius 1995–2014 Mexico 1990–2014
Mongolia 2005–2014 Montenegro 2005–2014
Morocco 1982–2011 Mozambique 1997–2007
Namibia 2000–2014 Nepal 1999–2008
Netherlands 1992–2014 New Zealand 1992–2008
Nicaragua 1995–2014 Norway 1996–2014
Pakistan 2002–2014 Panama 1980–2014
Paraguay 1982–2014 Peru 1993–2014
Philippines 2001–2014 Poland 1995–2014
Portugal 1991–2014 Republic of Moldova 1999–2014
Romania 1995–2014 Russian Federation 1997–2014
Saint Lucia 1994–2006 Sao Tome and Principe 2003–2012
Senegal 1988–2002 Serbia 2004–2014
Seychelles 2011–2014 Singapore 1985–2014
Slovakia 1994–2014 Slovenia 1995–2014
South Africa 1996–2014 Spain 1981–2014
Sri Lanka 2002–2014 Suriname 2004–2014
Sweden 1997–2014 Switzerland 1980–2014
Macedonia 2002–2014 Taiwan 1994–2013
Thailand 2001–2013 Trinidad and Tobago 1980–2014
Turkey 1985–2014 Turks and Caicos Islands 2002–2007
Tanzania 1988–2012 Uganda 1991–2003
Ukraine 1999–2014 United Kingdom 1991–2014
United States 1980–2014 Uruguay 1996–2014
Venezuela 1981–2001 Vietnam 1999–2014
Yemen 1999–2014 Zambia 2000–2010
Zimbabwe 2011–2014
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C.2 Shift-share Details
This section documents how world polarization happens mostly within industries.
We can express the share of each occupation as a weighted average at the country
level. For period t:
lc,j,t =
∑
I
sc,t(I)lc,j,t(I) (C.1)
where lc,j,t is the country’s employment share of occupation j, sc,t(I) is the country’s
employment share of industry I, and lc,j,t(I) is the share of occupation j within
industry I. The change between period 0 and t can be decomposed into its between
and within industry components:
∆lc,j,t =
∑
I
∆sc,t(I)l¯c,j,t(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between industries
effect
+
∑
I
∆lc,j,t(I)s¯c,t(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within industries
effect
(C.2)
l¯c,j,t(I) is the average between time 0 and t of the conditional occupation share, and
and s¯c,t(I) that of the industry share. The between effect refers to the impact of
structural transformation, the changes in the productive structure of the economy.
The within effect refers to the occupational mix inside each industry.
Both the changes within- and between-industries contribute to polarization. The
within-industry changes dominate: on average, the within-industry contribution ac-
counts for 63% of polarization.
C.3 VAR Convergence System
The VAR model analyzes the productivity gaps with respect to the U.S. levels.
Remember these gaps are defined as:
A˜c,j,t =
Ac,j,t
AUS,j,t
The vector of log deviations from the U.S. is a˜c,t = [log A˜a,c,t, log A˜r,c,t, log A˜m,c,t]
′,
and the econometric model I use is
a˜c,t − a˜c,t−1 = αc + Ba˜c,t−1 + ec,t (C.3)
αc = [αa,c, αr,c, αm,c] captures country fixed-effects, B is a 3×3 matrix containing the
β coefficients associated with the lagged log-deviations, and ec,t = [εa,c,t, εr,c,t, εm,c,t]
is the vector of error terms.
This system implies a long-run expectations for the gaps in each of the countries
a˜c,t = αc + (I+B)a˜c,t−1 (C.4)
The dynamics are dictated by the eigenvalues associated to I+B. When all eigen-
values are unique, the system can be transformed into three autonomous difference
equations. Matrix I+B can be diagonalized as follows:
D = V−1(I+B)V (C.5)
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where D is a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues, and V is an invertible
matrix with the associated eigenvectors. If we define, zc,t = V
−1a˜c,t, the system can
be rewritten as:
zc,t = V
−1a˜c,t
= V−1αc + V−1(I+B)VV
−1a˜c,t−1
= ζc + Dzc,t−1 (C.6)
This is a system of autonomous difference equations. If the j-th row has a real-
valued eigenvalue (λj), then
zj,c,t = ζj,c + λjzj,c,t−1
⇒ zj,c,t = ζj,c
1− λj +
(
zj,0 − ζj,c
1− λj
)
λtj (C.7)
This equation is convergent when |λj| < 1, so that the last term goes to 0 as t→∞.
ζj,c/(1 − λj) is the steady-state level, and λj determines how fast deviations from it
converge. Therefore, 1 − λj is the percentage of the gap with respect to the steady-
state level that is closed each period, or the convergence rate.
If the j-th and j + 1-th rows have complex-valued eigenvalues of the form λj =
α + θi, λj+1 = α− θi, then the homogeneous parts have form
zj,c,t = r
t(A1 cosωt+ A2 sinωt) (C.8)
zj+1,c,t = r
t(B1 cosωt+B2 sinωt) (C.9)
where r2 = α2 + θ2 is the modulus, and defines the convergence rate.
C.4 A Model of Task Investment Specific Technical Change to Understand
Polarization
The goal of this model is to understand two aspects of modern economic growth:
the technological factors behind occupational employment shares, and their change
over time. This fits naturally into an investment specific technical change framework,
which needs to be extended to include the different tasks.
Economic Environment
Consider an economy populated by a representative household. Its preferences are
given by:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt log(ct) (C.10)
where ct represents consumption during period t, and β > 0 is the discount factor.
This economy follows the task based approach to production (Acemoglu and Au-
tor, 2011). Tasks are the base units of work, that are combined as intermediate inputs
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to produce final output. There are three tasks: abstract (a), routine (r), and manual
(m). Task specific variables are denoted by the j subindex, so that j ∈ {a, r,m}. The
production of task j requires the labor services of occupation j and capital, which
is specifically tailored to the production of that task. Technological progress is cap-
tured by At, which is total factor productivity, and is neutral across tasks. These are
combined according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yj,t = Atk
α
j,tl
1−α
j,t (C.11)
where α > 0 determines the capital share in income.
Final output requires three intermediate inputs: abstract, routine, and manual
tasks. These are combined according to the following constant elasticity of substitu-
tion production function, similar to Goos et al. (2014):
yt =
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ωσj y
ε−1
ε
j,t
 εε−1 (C.12)
where ε > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among tasks, ωj > 0 is the production
intensity of task j, and σ = (1 − α + αε)/ε is a scaling factor due to the nested
productive structure. These task intensities add up to one.
Final output can be split between consumption and investment in the three capital
stocks:
yt = ct +
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t (C.13)
Investment expenditures do not translate one-to-one into new capital. Instead,
one unit of investment converts into qj units of capital. The capital accumulation
evolves according to:
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + qj,tij,t (C.14)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and qj,t is the task investment specific technological
level. This notion of investment specific technical change follows Greenwood et al.
(1997). Differently to them, investment specific technical change is task specific, which
means that the efficiency to produce capital is different across tasks. This also implies
that capital is task specific; it can only be used in the production of task j. Capital
stocks are convertible across tasks, but the household faces different prices when doing
so (1/qj,t units of consumption).
Labor can be allocated to the production of the three tasks. It is also perfectly
mobile among tasks, and homogeneous. The total labor force is normalized to 1, so
that:
1 =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
lj,t (C.15)
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Competitive Equilibrium
In each period, the state of the economy is characterized by total factor productivity
At, and by the task specific capital stocks {kj,t}j∈{a,r,m} and investment specific tech-
nological levels {qj,t}j∈{a,r,m}. Their sequence of technological levels determines the
sequential competitive equilibrium, which is explained in what follows.
Household
The household owns the task specific stocks of capital, which are rented at the
price Rj,t. It also supplies its labor to the task producers, and earns wages wj,t. The
problem it faces is:
max
{ct,{lj,t,ij,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt log(ct)
subject to:
ct +
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
(wj,tlj,t +Rj,tkj,t)
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + qj,tij,t for j ∈ {a, r,m}
1 =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
lj,t (C.16)
taking the sequence of prices {{Rj,t, wj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0 as given. Consumption goods
work as the numeraire in this model.
Intermediate Task Producers
Firms producing tasks sell their product and rent capital and labor in competitive
markets. Their optimization problem is:
max
kj,t,lj,t
pij,t = pj,tAtk
α
j,tl
1−α
j,t −Rj,tkj,t − wj,tlj,t (C.17)
taking prices pj,t, Rj,t and wj,t as given. This is a static problem, and due to constant
returns to scale and competitive markets, profits are zero.
Final Output Producers
Firms producing final output also participate in competitive markets. Their op-
timization problem is:
max
{yj,t}j∈{a,r,m}
pit =
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ωσj y
ε−1
ε
j,t
 εε−1 − ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
pj,tyj,t (C.18)
taking task prices pj,t as given. As in the problem of intermediate task producers,
this is a static problem where profits are zero.
Equilibrium
A sequential competitive equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of allocations
{ct, yt, {lj,t, ij,t, kj,t+1, yj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0, a sequence of prices {{Rj,t, wj,t, pj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0,
a sequence of task investment specific technological levels {{qj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0, and a
sequence of total factor productivities {At}∞t=0 such that:
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1. The sequence {ct, {lj,t, ij,t, kj,t+1}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0 solves the household’s optimiza-
tion problem, taking as given the initial stocks of capital {kj,0}j∈{a,r,m}, and the
sequence of prices and investment technological levels {{Rj,t, wj,t, qj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0.
2. The sequence {{yj,t, kj,t, lj,t, }j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0 solves the problems of intermediate
task producers, taking as given the sequence of prices and total factor produc-
tivities {{Rj,t, wj,t, pj,t}j∈{a,r,m}, At}∞t=0.
3. The sequence {yt, {yj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0 solves the problems of final output firms,
taking as given the sequence of prices {{pj,t}j∈{a,r,m}}∞t=0.
4. Markets clear:
yt = ct +
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t (C.19)
yj,t = Atk
α
j,tl
1−α
j,t (C.20)
1 =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
lj,t (C.21)
5. Capital stocks follow their laws of motion
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + qj,tij,t (C.22)
C.4.1 Model Estimation
This section describes how the model is parametrized to match certain features
of the data. This is done in several steps. Broadly speaking, the employment shares
are informative of the relative composition of task specific capital stocks. These
are leveled up using data on real income and total factor productivity. The capital
accumulation process implies a path for the units of investment, that are a mixture
of the resources invested, and the levels of investment specific technology (ij,tqj,t).
To separate those, I use data on investment shares for a benchmark year. Finally,
the intertemporal Euler equations imply the rest of the path for the levels of task
investment specific technology.
At each point in time, occupational employment shares in the data determine
the model’s relative capital stocks. This follows from the optimality conditions when
task producers decide how much labor to hire. Labor is freely mobile and homoge-
neous, which equalizes wages across the production of tasks. Therefore, the first order
conditions for the task producers’ problem (C.17) imply that
li,t
lj,t
=
(
pi,t
pj,t
) 1
α ki,t
kj,t
=
ωi
ωj
(
kj,t
ki,t
) α(1−ε)
1−α(1−ε)
(C.23)
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With information on the production intensities, ωj, and the capital share α and
elasticity of substitution ε, this equation leads to the relative capital stocks.
The levels of capital are used to match the levels of income in the data. Solving
for the intertemporal allocations of the model in terms of the capital stocks yields the
following expression for final output:
yt = At
 ∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ωj/k
α(1−ε)
1−α(1−ε)
j,t
−
1−α(1−ε)
1−ε
(C.24)
The income and total factor productivity data, that come from the Penn World
Tables, are normalized to the US levels in 2000. The next logical step is to normalize
the US capital stocks in that year. This serves two purposes. First, it provides a way
to estimate the intensity parameters ωj from equation (C.23). Second, this choice
expresses the rest of the capital stocks in relative terms to US levels in 2000. These
are recovered from equation (C.24).
Capital accumulation provides a way to measure effective investment:
kj,t+1 = (1− δ)kj,t + qj,tij,t (C.25)
The problem now is to disentangle investment technological levels and investment
expenses from effective investment, i.e., separating the qj,tij,t series into qj,t and ij,t.
As a first approximation, I use the Euler equations:
ct+1
ct
= qj,tβ
[
Rj,t+1 +
1− δ
qj,t+1
]
(C.26)
Assuming that the growth rate of qj,t is the same for all tasks for a year provides a
way to approximate the task investment specific technological levels:
qj,tRj,t+1 = qj′,tRj′,t+1 (C.27)
Finally, the levels are scaled to match the investment shares in 2000.
This solves for the task investment specific technology levels in one year. The path
is completed through an iterative process that uses the household’s Euler equations
and the resource constraints. The Euler equations inform about relative growth rates
in qj,t, and the resource constraints level that growth.
The initial estimates of qj,t imply as well the consumption level. Therefore, the
Euler equations and the resource constraint for the following period pose a system of
4 equations in 4 unknowns:
ct+1
ct
= qj,tβ
[
Rj,t+1 +
1− δ
qj,t+1
]
(C.28)
ct+1 = yt+1 −
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
qj,t+1ij,t+1
qj,t+1
(C.29)
This is possible because the series of capital stocks was already estimated: it deter-
mines the rental rates Rj,t+1, output yt+1, and effective investment ij,t+1qj,t+1. This
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process can be iterated forwards, up to the final year with information, or backwards
to the initial year. This way, the entire path of task investment specific technology
levels and consumption can be inferred.
The rest of the parameters are determined from the Penn World Tables, or bor-
rowed from other studies. The capital share in income is set to 0.4, which is the
average found in the data. Similarly, the depreciation rate is averaged to 0.05. The
discount factor β is set to 0.95, and the elasticity of substitution is set to 0.0625, to
match the estimate of Vindas (2017) in the United States.
C.4.2 Alternative Identification Strategy
An alternative way to disentangle initial task investment specific technological
levels is explained in this section. Its actual implementation is left to future iterations
of this project.
Investment is measured in different units, depending on the context. First, the
investment expenses ij,t, like those on the resource constraint (C.13), are denoted in
units of consumption. Second, effective investment is measured in units of capital,
which is qj,tij,t. The relative price of investment for capital in task j is the number of
units of consumption paid, per measured units of investment:
P Ij,t
PCj,t
=
ij,t
qj,tij,t
=
1
qj,t
(C.30)
In the data, we don’t observe these individually, but rather through an aggregate
investment price. This is a weighted average over investment expenditure shares,
which is the first moment to target. It is given by:
P It
PCt
=
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t∑
j′∈{a,r,m}
ij′,t
P Ij,t
PCj,t
=
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t∑
j′∈{a,r,m}
ij′,t
1
qj,t
(C.31)
The second moment is the aggregate relative price of capital. It is informative
since this is another weighed average; the composition of the current capital stock is
different from the composition of investment expenses. In particular, this is equal to
the replacement-value weighted average of the relative prices of capital, and is given
by:
PKt
PCt
=
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
kj,t/qj,t∑
j′∈{a,r,m}
kj′,t/qj′,t
A
1
α
t+1
qj,t
(C.32)
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The third and final moment is the investment rate, which is given by:
st =
∑
j∈{a,r,m}
ij,t
Yt
(C.33)
Intuitively, the investment and capital prices pin down the relative levels of qj,t across
occupations, since these are two different weighted averages. The investment rate,
on the other hand, defines the actual levels that are compatible with the aggregate
investment decisions.
To solve this system, it has to be expressed in terms of the quantities that are
available so far. This requires substituting ij,t with qj,tij,t/qj,t. This results in a
quadratic set of equations in the task investment specific technology levels. To solve
it, I log-linearize this system around 1. Its approximation is given by:
ln
(
P It
PCt
)
≈ −
∑
j
ij,tqj,t∑
j′ ij′,tqj′,t
[
2− ij,tqj,t∑
j′ ij′,tqj′,t
]
ln qj,t (C.34)
ln
(
PKt
PCt
)
≈ −
∑
j
kj,t∑
j′ kj′,t
[
2− kj,t∑
j′ kj′,t
]
ln qj,t (C.35)
st ≈
∑
j
ij,tqj,t
Yt
−
∑
j
ij,tqj,t
Yt
ln qj,t (C.36)
This is a linear system on log-deviations from 1, which then allows to approximate
the task investment specific technological levels in 2005.
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